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COMPELLED AFFIRMATIONS, FREE SPEECH, AND
THE U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL
POLICY
Tobias Barrington Wolff
INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scene. At an Air Force base outside
Colorado Springs, Colorado, early in 1996, two young officers

have gotten together after work to have some coffee and relax.
One of the two, Anne, is a lesbian. Since the time she entered

the service, Anne has assiduously avoided making any reference to her sexual orientation, as the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy requires.' None of her friends or fellow officers know
'©1997 Tobias Barrington Wolff. All Rights Reserved.
t Clerk, the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Yale Law School, J.D., 1997.
There are many people-colleagues and mentors alike-to whom I am
indebted for the assistance that they offered while I was writing this Article. I
owe my greatest debt of gratitude, however, to the gay and lesbian
servicemembers who agreed to lend me their experience and wisdom by granting
the interviews around which this Article took shape. Because some of those
servicemembers must remain anonymous, I have decided not to thank any of them
by name; leaving any one of them out of such an acknowledgment would simply
be unacceptable. This Article would not have been possible without their
generosity. I dedicate this work to them and to the many tens of thousands of gay
men and lesbians who continue to render honorable service to our country in the
U.S. armed forces.
For his scholarly guidance, I am especially indebted to Owen Fiss, who taught
me what the First Amendment is really all about. Glenn Edwards, whose
knowledge in the field of gay rights eclipses my own, was a constant source of
information, wisdom, and encouragement. Michelle Benecke of Servicamembers
Legal Defense Network put me in touch with many of my interview subjects and
enabled this Article to get off the ground. Greg Bowman, Betty Fletcher, Paul
Gewirtz, Ryan Goodman, William Norris, John Pottow, William Rubenstein,
Sandhya Subramanian, Cynthia Griffin Wolff, Robert Paul Wolff, Keji Yoghino,
and the members of the Spring 1997 Sexual Orientation Workshop at Yale Law
School all gave the kind of serious critical attention to this Article that any
scholar would be thankful for. All errors are my own.
1 See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 654
(1997). The statute begins by listing fifteen legislative findings, the first fourteen
of which essentially offer arguments for the proposition made in the fifteenth, that
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that Anne is gay, and Anne never talks about "gay issues"
around the base. The other officer, Nancy, is straight. Nancy

"[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the
essence of military capability." Id. § 654(a)(15). The statute goes on to require that
a member of the armed forces be separated from the service on a finding of one
or more of the following(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless there are
further findings, made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in such regulations, that the member has demonstrated that(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior,
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of
the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding, made
and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in the regulations,
that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who
engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or
intends to engage in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person
known to be of the same biological sex.
Id. § 654(b).
The statute's definition of "homosexual act" reads as follows:
(3) The term "homosexual act" means(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described in
subparagraph (A).
Id. § 654(0 (emphasis added).
This definition includes not only sexual activity as traditionally understood, but
also behavior such as hugging or hand-holding. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d
1280, 1291 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that "homosexual conduct" includes
"handholding"). In contrast, the only formal limitations that the military places on
a heterosexual servicemember's choice of sexual acts (as distinguished from the
servicemember's choice of sexual partners) are found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice's criminal penalties for sodomy-anal and oral sex. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 925(a) (1997), codified at U.C.M.J. art. 125; see also Able, 88 F.3d at 1291
("[Tihere is no doubt that the Act treats homosexuals and heterosexuals differently
even though they have engaged in similar acts within a broad range (from
handholding to intercourse).").
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has known Anne since the two started officer training together
a few years earlier. The following conversation-an unremarkable one for the two friends-takes place on a wintry Tuesday
evening.
Nancy:

So what are you doing for Easter next month?

Anne:

Going to my folks' house, probably. [She smiles wryly.]
Once I graduated from high school and actually left
home, my parents decided that the holidays were Extremely Important Events that required my attendance.
You?

Nancy:

I'm going with Dave to visit his family in Michigan.

Anne:

And are we happy about these plans?

Nancy:

Oh, Dave's family is great. Dave himself, however, turns
into a space alien whenever we go to visit them. [They
laugh.] Oh, Annie, you know how a man acts when he
takes you home to meet the family for the first time,
right?

Anne:

[Anne's eyes drop for a moment and her smile fades a
bit.] I... guess we all know about that.

Nancy:

Well, Dave hasn't quite managed to move beyond that
phase yet. I figured that he would loosen up around his
family after we got engaged last fall, but that hasn't happened. If anything, he's gotten more uptight.

Anne:

At least it probably means that Dave won't make you visit
the in-laws too frequently after you two get married.

Nancy:

True, true. Still, I suggest you stand far away from the
bouquet toss at our wedding this summer. Believe me, you
have enough to worry about in "this man's Air Force"
without also taking on a man's set of issues with his family! [Nancy laughs heartily; after a slight hesitation, Anne
joins in.]

This is the most prosaic of scenes. It is the type of conversation
that any one of us might expect to have with a friend or acquaintance. It also illustrates the heart of the First Amend-

ment right that is burdened by the U.S. military's Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy ("DADT"): the right not to be compelled to
make a false affirmation of one's identity, ideas or beliefs.
Unlike the blanket exclusion that preceded it, the Don't Ask,
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Don't Tell policy permits gay people to serve in the military.2
It does so, however, only on condition that they acquiesce in
lies-indeed, that they lie actively-about the most personal
aspects of their lives and their identities. The new policy does
more than mandate mere silence; it compels gay
servicemembers to make involuntary and false affirmations of
a heterosexual identity that is not their own. It imposes, in
other words, what the Supreme Court pronounced in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette3 to be among
the most serious of burdens on an individual's First Amend-

ment rights: to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion [and] force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."4
It is impossible to be "agnostic" as to one's sexual orientation in the course of normal social interactions. Rather, there
is a presumption of heterosexuality that pervades our lives. In

all but the most unusual of circumstances, people will assume
that any given individual is straight unless they have reason
to believe otherwise. That assumption informs every conversa-

tion and interaction.' People's most ordinary statements and

Each branch of the service has issued regulations under the new policy that
make it clear that gay men and lesbians are now allowed to serve in the military
while at the same time imposing special burdens on their speech rights. For example, the Navy's implementing regulation under the policy reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
A person's sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter,
and is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested
by homosexual conduct. During the accession process, all applicants, prospects and members of the dep [sic] shall not be asked or required to
reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual and will
not be asked or required to reveal if they have engaged in homosexual
conduct unless independent evidence is received indicating that the applicant engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a statement that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual or words to that effect.
Navadmin 033/94 PP 4, 9.C(3). See also DoD Directive 1332.14.H.l.a (1993) ("Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1298 ("[Ihe Act does not bar those who have a homosexual orientation but are not likely to engage in homosexual acts.").
3 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2

Id. at 642.

As Professor Janet Halley has written, "To borrow the language of semiology, the public status 'heterosexual' is an unmarked signifier, the category to
which everyone is assumed to belong. Something has to happen to mark an individual with the identity, 'homosexual.' " Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
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questions regularly carry with them the presumption that
those with whom they are speaking are straight, just like
Nancy's half of the conversation does in the scene reproduced
above. Moreover, a gay person's silence in such a situation is
not a neutral response; rather, silence serves to reaffirm this
"heterosexual presumption." When a gay person does not disabuse others of the erroneous presumptions of heterosexuality
that they have made-when Anne is silent about her gay identity, for example, in the face of Nancys comments and questions-she is affirming a straight identity as surely as if she
actually framed the lie in words. And silence frequently is not
sufficient-or even feasible-when one attempts to hide a gay
identity. Gay people are sometimes forced to lie actively about
who they are if they wish to keep their identities hidden. For a
gay person, in other words, the experience of being in the closet is not an experience of having no public sexual identity at
all; it is one of pretending to be straight. When silence as to
one's gay identity is compelled, at all times and in all situations, this false affirmation of heterosexuality is compelled, as
well. A policy that permits gay people to serve in the military
but prohibits them ever from identifying themselves as gay is a
policy that compels gay servicemembers falsely to identify
themselves as straight.'
Among the Federal Courts of Appeals that have analyzed
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy under
the First Amendment,7 none has understood the nature, or the
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 915, 946 (1989).
" Professor Nan Hunter made this point concisely at the end of her Commentary in the Virginia Law Review.
[Sluppression of identity speech leads to a compelled falsehood, a
violation of the principle that an individual has the right not to speak as
well as to speak. In the absence of identity speech, most persons are
assumed to be heterosexual. To paraphrase the ACT-UP slogan, silent =
straight. To compel silence, then, is to force persons who are not heterosexual in effect to lie.
Nan D. Hunter, Commentary, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1718 (1993).
'See Holmes v. California Army Natl Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997);
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45
(1997); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80
F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). Shortly before
this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying ea bane
review in Holmes that was accompanied by a dissent from the denial of rehearing
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extent, of the burden that the policy places on gay
servicemembers' speech rights. Those courts have framed their
analysis in terms of the evidentiary use to which the military
puts a servicemember's statement that she is gay. They have
concluded that, if same-sex sexual behavior may be regulated,

then a servicemember's speech about her gay identity may
legitimately be used as sufficient evidence of her "propensity"
to engage in the forbidden homosexual acts. Such an analysis,
whatever its technical merits, fails to address the core of the
policy's impact: the false affirmation of heterosexual identity
that the policy constantly forces upon gay servicemembers.
This Article seeks to unite some of the Supreme Court's
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence with a commonsense account of the lived experience of gay men and lesbians
in order to provide the understanding that has heretofore been

lacking in judicial review of the policy.8 It takes as its starting
en banc by Judge Harry Pregerson. See Holmes v. California Nat'l Army Guard,
No. 96-15726 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1998) (order denying rehearing en banc). The dissent, which was joined by Judges Reinhardt, Kozinski, Hawkins and Tashima,
touches briefly upon the thesis of this Article. See id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
("From another perspective, as a practical matter the silence that this policy imposes on gay and lesbian military personnel can lead others to presume that they
assent to a view about their own sexuality that they do not espouse.").
" In his paradigm-shifting analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), Professor Kendall Thomas properly criticizes
those legal scholars who complacently accept the conceptual frameworks offered by
the Supreme Court in conducting their analyses of individual claims of right, particularly in the realm of privacy.
[I]f one believes, as I do, that the intellectual concerns and commitments
of students of constitutional jurisprudence overlap but are not congruent
with those of the Supreme Court itself, one might well ask whether this
strategy of assessing the Court's work exclusively or primarily on its own
terms helps or hinders the distinctively critical project of constitutional
scholarship.
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435
(1992). Professor Thomas makes this criticism the launching-off point for his own,
radical and virtuosic analysis.
This Article proceeds from the premise that, in the realm of the First Amendment, the Court's well-established doctrines are, in fact, entirely sufficient to produce a meaningful and sophisticated analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It
aims its challenge at the failure of those judges who have reviewed the policy to
understand the lived experience of gay men and lesbians and to recognize the applicability of those doctrines to that experience-a species of challenge that Thomas also invokes, to powerful effect. See id. at 1498-99. I attribute this difference
in approach to a meaningful difference in the state of the law in the areas of
freedom of expression and of privacy, a subject that I will address, briefly, later
on. See infra notes 81-92, 185 and accompanying text.
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point, in Part I, the stories of gay and lesbian
servicemembers-those who have served under the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy and those who served under the blanket exclusion that preceded it. Their stories illustrate the impact
that the forcibly imposed closet of the new policy has upon the
gay people whom the military now formally invites to join its
ranks. They give needed depth and substance to the harms
that the Court first identified in West Virginia v. Barnette.'
The Article then goes on to provide an approach for conducting
a proper First Amendment analysis of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
Part II analyzes the policy's reliance on the expressive power
of the silence of gay and lesbian servicemembers and discusses
the Court's treatment of silence in its First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III examines the special relationship that exists
between compelled affirmations and identity speech. Finally,
Part IV draws these strands together and scrutinizes the policy
through the lens of West Virginia v. Barnette.
I. THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE: STORIES OF GAY SERVICEMEMBERS
IN THE MILITARY
Any author who chooses to incorporate individual narratives into a legal analysis bears the burden of explaining the
purpose for which those narratives are offered. This is especially true following the powerful critique that Professors Daniel
Farber and Suzanna Sherry have levied at the haphazard use
of personal narratives that they believe has characterized
much recent scholarship.' Farber and Sherry take particular
aim at feminist legal scholars and critical race theorists, whom
they criticize for attempting to escape the scrutiny of traditional, rigorous scholarly standards."' Such scholars, they explain,
frequently claim to write from a unique and distinctive per-

' In her analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, Professor Halley has
emphasized what she calls "an important aspect of [gay servicemembers'] bringing
their challenge to the public forum of the federal district court: the opportunity to
display to the court the actual human beings upon whom the Statute stood ready
to operate." Janet E. Halley, The StatuslConduct Distinction in the 1993 Reuisions
to Military Anti-Gay Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GAY L. Q. 159, 182 (1996).
'o See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratiues,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
" See id. at 809-19.
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spective-to speak in a "different voice" 2 that cannot easily
be translated into the analytic prose of legal analysis and so
cannot be evaluated by traditional standards. Farber and Sherry reject such strong claims of narrative prerogative. Instead,
they "suggest that legal scholarship should help the reader
understand law, and that legal scholarship should comport
with the goals and attributes of the academy."13 Thus, while
they unreservedly embrace the proposition that "some storytelling is a legitimate form of legal scholarship,"' Farber and
Sherry insist that scholars "take greater steps to ensure that
their stories are accurate and typical, to articulate the legal
relevance of the stories, and to include an analytic dimension
in their work." 5 "The crucial test of scholarly writing," they
conclude, "must be whether it provides an increased understanding of some issue relating to law." 6
For present purposes, this Article need not engage with
the broader implications of Farber and Sherry's challenge, as
the purpose for which it offers the interviews that follow is a
relatively conservative one. The Article seeks to demonstrate
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes burdens on the
expressive rights of gay and lesbian servicemembers that can
readily be described under the Supreme Court's existing First
Amendment jurisprudence, but that the federal courts have
failed to produce a meaningful analysis of the policy because
they have simply failed to understand how the dynamics of the
closet actually operate in the everyday lives of gay people. 1
' Id. at 809. The term comes from Carol Gilligan's pathbreaking work of the
same name. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).

,s Farber & Sherry, supra note, at 809.
1 Id. at 808. For an example of Farber and Sherry's own use of narrative in

legal analysis, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13
CONST. COMENT. 257, 265 (1996).
15
16

Farber & Sherry, supra note, at 809.
Farber & Sherry, supra note 10, at 824. See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing

the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1030 (1991) ("[Ilt seems reasonable to ask
of narrators who are, in fact, legal scholars that their stories be framed in such a
way as to shed light on legal questions.").
17 Thus, this Article utilizes individual narrative for a purpose that is narrower
than those proposed by Professor William Eskridge in his response to Farber and
Sherry. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1994). Eskridge argues that "gaylaw provides a particularly attractive field for
narratives, even under the conservative criteria laid out by Farber and Sherry," id.
at 610, precisely because gay people and their stories have been actively repressed
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Indeed, this failure of understanding has amounted to what
Professor Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has termed a "privilege of
unknowing." 8 Sedgwick has observed that it can be an effective tool for wielding social power to remain ignorant of the
cultural identity or experiences of others. "If M. Mitterand
knows English but Mr. Reagan lacks French," for example, "it
is the urbane M. Mitterand who must negotiate in an acquired
tongue, the ignorant Mr. Reagan who may dilate in his native
one."' More generally, "it is the interlocutor who has or pretends to have the less broadly knowledgeable understanding of
interpretive practice who will define the terms of the exchange." ° Sedgwick's observation certainly holds true in legal
analysis, where the ability of a claimant to benefit from an
established legal doctrine is always limited by the ability of a
judge to recognize, after engaging in a formal dialogue with the
claimant, that the doctrine in question should in fact apply."
Thus, the interviews in this Article are offered for the purpose
of demonstrating a crucial fact about the lived experience of
gay people that has heretofore been absent from judicial review
of the policy: that forcing a gay person to remain silent about
her sexual identity, at all times and in all places, in fact forces
her to affirm a heterosexual identity that is not her own, and
so to live a lie.
I take Professor Susan Bandes' recent article on the use of
victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings to
offer a powerful endorsement of such a use of individual narrative.' In denouncing the Supreme Court's validation of victim
in American jurisprudence, remaining hidden and invisible until very recently. He
then provides a rich account of the particular difficulties that gay claimants can
encounter in legal settings. Eskridge argues persuasively that gay narratives can
have a transformative impact by demonstrating the hidden inequities in state
policies, see id. at 611-17, or the connections among seemingly unrelated policies,
see id. at 617-21; can offer challenges to the categorical assumptions upon which
policies and legal doctrines frequently rest, see id. at 621-30; and can reinforce
activist political movements, giving focus to radical challenges to the proper scope
of law and state regulation, see id. at 630-40.
"' Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Privilege of Unknowing: Diderot's The Nun, in TENDENCIES 23 (1993).
9Id.
20 Id.

See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1456 ('It is precisely this 'ignorance effec?
that provides an ideological anchor for the oppression of gays and lesbians, which
the secrecy of the 'closet? has historically aimed to mitigate.").
' See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narratiue and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
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impact statements,' Professor Bandes argues that the propriety of introducing individual narratives into formal legal analysis depends in large part on the extent to which those narratives have, or have not, already been taken into account in the
process of articulating and administering a legal doctrine.'
The impact of violent crime upon its victims, she concludes,
suffers from no infirmity in this regard: "We do not need elaborate structures to assist us in feeling fear, pain, and grief for
those like us who have suffered violence at the hands of the
other. This is already the dominant narrative of the criminal
trial."' Because the story of the victim of a violent crime is
one of the primal, animating forces that gave rise to the criminal justice system in the first place, the heavy-handed reintroduction of that story into the ongoing administration of the
system adds very little and threatens to distort or unbalance
the decision making process. Similarly, in order for a newspaper to argue to a court that it ought to be able to invoke the
doctrine forbidding prior restraints when it is threatened with
a restrictive injunction, it need not provide a highly personalized account of the harms that the paper, its readership, and
the larger community will suffer if it is enjoined from publishing its controversial story. The doctrine of prior restraint grew
out of the Court's painfully adequate understanding of those
precise harms. Rather, it is when courts demonstrate a com-

plete inability to mediate between general rules and particular
cases in this fashion that it is most clearly necessary for indi-

vidual narrative to reenter legal analysis.26

CHI. L. REv. 361 (1996).
' See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland,

482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
24 See Bandes, supra note 22, at 382-90.

Bandes, supra note 22, at 409.
26 I borrow this phrase from Professor Mark Tushnet, who has written

at
length about the use of narrative in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet,
The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39
(1990); Mark V. Tushnet, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America, 14
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 539 (1989) (book review). In one essay, Tushnet summarizes
his approach, arguing that "constitutional adjudication [should be] the vehicle we

use to mediate particular cases and general rules." Mark V. Tushnet, Colloquy,
The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992). Acknowledg-

ing the particular capacity of narrative to ground legal analysis in concrete experience, Tushnet asserts that a proper use of narrative is one that facilitates this
mediation between the particular and the general, rather than distorting or ob-
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In theory, then, these interviews should be unnecessary to
this Article's project. If a legal audience could be relied upon to
recognize the most basic facts about the everyday lives of gay
men and lesbians and to understand how those facts map onto
the existing analytical framework of the First Amendment,
then the Article could simply proceed directly to its constitutional analysis.' But the performance of the federal judiciary
in its analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has made it
clear that, at least for now, something more is needed in order
to ensure that the claims of gay servicemembers are heard and
understood.'
Twenty-one individuals from all different parts of the
country and all different branches of the armed forces agreed
to be interviewed for this Article. Most served under the Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy and have recently left the military. A
number were litigants in challenges brought against the policy

structing it. See id. at 256-58, 258-60, 297-310. Under Tushnet's approach, then,
the function of the interviews in this Article is to inject into judicial review of the
Dont Ask, Don't Tell policy some of the particularities of the lives of gay
servicemembers that have thus far been absent. In other words, this Article's
contention-to use Tushnet's terms-is that the necessary process of mediation has
never occurred in judicial review of the policy because the relevant particularities
have been entirely absent from the court's understanding. Thus, it is not simply
the case that judges have engaged in the process of mediation that Tushnet calls
for and have come up with flawed results; rather, through their ignorance, they
have bypassed that process altogether.
' In some feminist legal scholarship, in contrast, narratives constitute a vital
component of an article's thesis. The work of some feminist scholars emphasizes
the importance of concreteness and particularity-as opposed to abstraction and
generalization-in structuring normative arguments and rules of law. See Abrams,
supra note 16, at 975-76 (discussing different strands of feminist methodology).
Similarly, some feminist scholars have levied challenges at the legitimacy of the
impartial, authoritative voice of linear reason in which most traditional legal scholarship grounds itselE See, eg., Abrams, supra note 16, at 976, 987; Marie Ashe,
Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on 'Reproduction"and the Law,
13 NovA L. REV. 355 (1989) (bringing these methods to bear on issue of women's
reproductive rights). For these scholars, individual narrative is a vital component
of their work; it is partly constitutive of their arguments. This Article makes no
such claims.
I In characterizing that 'something more," Professor Richard Delgado has written that "[sltories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes
place. " Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1988). See also Thomas, supra note 8, at
1498-99.
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in federal court. A few are still serving on active duty. The
interviews took place between February and August of 1997.
The texts of the interviews are drawn from servicemembers'
responses to broad, open-ended questions about their experiences living under the policy and, in particular, the ways in
which the policy has forced them to prevaricate or lie. Every
individual who agreed to participate in these interviews had
already devoted a great deal of thought to the issues of identity
and personal integrity that the Article explores-a fact that
probably comes as no surprise to most gay and lesbians readers, whether they have served in the military or not. Gay men
and lesbians must regularly make decisions about how to navigate their own personal closets-how to "manage" public
knowledge of their sexual identities in the face of the persistent presumption that everyone is heterosexual unless proven
otherwise." It should come as no surprise to find that gay
29

Professor Kenji Yoshino provides a cogent description of this dynamic in

questioning the propriety of the "closet" as a symbol for the problem of sexual
self-definition:
Gays can never be out and done with it; they must continually reiterate
their sexual orientation against a heterosexist presumption that reinstates
itself at every pause. The most damaging failure of the closet symbol is
perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person's disclosure of
his or her homosexual orientation as a binary constructed from the endpoints of that continuum. One is either "out' or "closeted": the closet
with its rigid door between the "outside" and the "inside" does not lend
itself to subtler gradations. However, these gradations are not only relevant, but crucial to an understanding of gay oppression. First, gays come
out in a gradual process that is misrepresented by a construct that
marks some point as the point at which they "come out." Second, most
gays disclose their homosexuality to some but not to others-for example
to their families but not their co-workers, or vice-versa-in a way that
the closet, which does not perform such discrimination between audiences,
fails to reflect. Finally, because it is impossible for any gay to be fully
.out" or "closeted," the endpoints of the continuum on which the binarism
is based do not exist.
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for
Gays, 96 COLu i. L. REV. 1753, 1810-11 (1996). Professor Halley has given a similar account of the presumption's operation:
[B]ecause the assumption of heterosexuality applies in virtually every
social interaction-from the encounter of teacher with student, salesperson with shopper, mother with daughter, Supreme Court Justice with
clerk--even the most forthright and fearless gay man or lesbian cannot
'come out" once and for all in a single public disclosure; as she moves
from one social setting to another, she will have to come out afresh or
acquiesce in the assignment to her of a nonreferential public identity.
Halley, supra note 5, at 947.
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and lesbian servicemembers, whose careers frequently depend

upon their success in managing their public identities, have
devoted careful thought to that "identity management" process

and the questions of honor and integrity that it raises." The
lies that gay and lesbian servicemembers are forced to tell
about themselves under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy are, to
say the least, a matter of active concern for them.
Under normal circumstances, members of the military
regularly have free or unstructured time, and most
servicemembers began their interviews by focusing on that
portion of their duty. A consistent theme that runs throughout
their accounts is the regularity with which the most ordinary
of social discourse in the military can implicitly bring an
individual's sexual orientation into issue. Indeed, this implicit
introduction of sexual orientation into social discourse frequently does not lie far beneath the surface. The interview of
former Navy Lieutenant Tracy Thorne speaks to this issue.
Thorne entered the Navy after graduating from Vanderbilt
University. He trained as a pilot and flew an A-6 Intruder
fighter plane until being separated and discharged after coming out of the closet on the television show, "Nightline." He has
brought a challenge to the policy in federal court that is still
ongoing.3 Speaking with hints of a light, formal Tennessee

" As Professor Halley has pointed out, it is discrimination, in particular, that
forces gay people to focus such scrupulous attention on both their private conceptions and the public's perception of their identities:
Antihomosexual discrimination encourages people to manipulate the identity they attach to themselves, both in the secrecy of their own minds
and on the public stage, in what I shall call their subjective and their
public identities. It ensures that personal desires, sexual behavior, subjective identity and public identity will frequently get out of sync with each
other. However carefully an individual disposes these elements, they are
all subject to sudden, either joyous or catastrophic, rearrangement.
Halley, supra note 5, at 933.
3 In 1993, Thorne brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia to challenge
the constitutionality of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. While he initially met
with some success in district court, that favorable disposition was vacated in light
of the Fourth Circuies decision in Thomasson u. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc). See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1996). On
remand following Tlomasson, Thorne lost his case. See Thorne v. Dep't of Defense,
945 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Va. 1996). His appeal is currently pending in the Fourth
Circuit.
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accent, Thorne describes the atmosphere that prevailed among
the "fly boys" who were his peers and buddies while he was
still on active duty.
The general thing that you faced on a regular basis was that, particularly being in a Naval aviation squadron, there's this kind of
swashbuckling mentality among the junior officers. For example,
where I was stationed at Virginia Beach, they had what was considered to be the ultimate Officer's Club. When I was there, through
the early 90s, it was filled with local women hunting for husbands,
female strippers-it was one big party, with Navy pilots flying in
from all around the country. The "thing to do" in your free time was
to head down to the 0' Club. If you didn't want to head down there
and ogle the bare-breasted women with all the other guys, people
would ask questions. Sometimes you could quietly sneak away, but,
you know, you couldn't always do that, so you had to make like you
were enjoying it.32
Moreover, as Thorne goes on to say, even those times when he
could "quietly sneak away" were not free from difficulty.

Friends naturally want to know how we spend our free time,
and buddies in the military are no different. Spending time

with gay friends, however, is something that no gay
servicemember can speak about with any candor. Thorne describes the dilemma that he and many others have faced.
After a typical weekend, I would show up at the squadron on a Monday morning, and everyone would ask, "What did you do this week-

end?" I couldn't tell them, for example, that I went to a movie on a
date. I would have to make stuff up, like that I worked on my car or
something.33

Indeed, one's sexual orientation is regularly brought into
issue in settings that are less explicitly concerned with sexual

titillation than the "0' Club" scene that Lieutenant Thorne
describes. A story from former Air Force Captain Elizabeth
Hillman is typical of many others. Hillman spent most of her
active duty time working as an orbital analyst at Cheyenne
Mountain Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. She
retired from the military after satisfying her obligation to the
Air Force in 1996 and has since enrolled as a student at Yale
Law School. Speaking methodically and with frank openness,

32 Telephone Interview with Tracy Thorne, former Lieutenant, United States
Navy (Apr. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Thorne Interview].
SId.
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Hillman tells of the complications that the heterosexual presumption can cause in the close relationships that exist among
peers in the service.
Because you can't speak up about your sexual orientation, you can't
put people at ease if they feel uncomfortable with the amount of
time you're spending with their partners. Wives and girlfriends can

easily feel threatened by the close working conditions between men
and women in the service, and there are times when you really want

to put someone at ease and tell her that she doesn't have to worry
about you going after her partner, but you can't do that if the reason

is that you're gay. For that matter, a woman will often get even
more nervous about your close working relationship with her partner because you're not reassuring her by telling her that you already
have a boyfriend or a husband. You frequently wind up inventing
stories anyway, to defuse a difficult situation.... One time in particular that this was a problem for me was when I was training for a
marathon with [a male friend).... Obviously, we were training
together, alone, for hours every day. His wife was feeling threatened
by the amount of time that we were spending together, and there

was nothing I could say to explain that she didn't need to feel
threatened unless I made something up or told her that I was a
lesbian?4

Such dilemmas are not limited to servicemembers' free
time. The workplace also presents many seemingly innocuous
situations in which the sexual orientation of servicemembers is
inexorably brought into issue, as a story from Anonymous
Officer Number One can attest. Anonymous Officer Number
One is a woman and a senior officer currently serving on active
duty in the armed forces. She requested that her name, branch
of service, and other identifying information be kept confidential because she feared that she would be vulnerable to reprisals if anyone suspected that she had made a contribution to
this Article. Anonymous Officer Number One is an experienced
and formidable professional, but her voice carried an edge of
apprehension and fear throughout the entire course of our interview. In speaking of the conditions under which she must
work as a closeted lesbian, she describes details that the most
careful examination by an outsider seeking to understand the
true impact of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy might easily
overlook.
I Interview with Elizabeth Hillnan, former Captain, United States Air Force,
in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 31, 1997) [hereinafter Hillman Interview].
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Another thing is photos on my desk, at work. It's a pretty standard
thing in the office to put pictures of husbands and boyfriends-past
or present-in prominent places on your desk. Usually, when I walk
into another woman's office, if I see pictures of pets and family on
her desk instead of men, I assume she might be gay. For the same
reason, I don't put pictures like that on my own desk-even though
I have a beautiful dog that I'd love to show off. In fact, I've thought
about putting pictures of male friends on my desk and making like
they're former boyfriends, just to deflect attention. I certainly have
[lesbian] friends who have done that."

The stresses on gay servicemembers to present a heterosexual identity at the workplace can also be applied in a less
subtle fashion. Many of the men interviewed for this Article
talked about the pervasiveness of homophobic jokes and comments among their peers in the military, and traditional
workplace settings provided no respite from such banter. Former Naval Academy Midshipman Joseph Steffan describes
such comments as constituting nothing less than an "institutionalized" practice. 6 Steffan was discharged from the Naval

" Interview with Anonymous Officer Number One, Senior Officer, United
States Military (April 17, 1997) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview Number One].
In a highly influential essay, Adrienne Rich discusses the impact of what she
terms "compulsory heterosexuality" on lesbians as individuals and on the women's
movement more generally. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD AND POETRY 22 (1986). Expanding upon work
begun by Katherine MacKinnon, Rich analyzes the particular set of enforced behaviors that gay women face in the workplace setting:
A lesbian, closeted on her job because of heterosexist prejudice, is not
simply forced into denying the truth of her outside relationships or private life. Her job depends on her pretending to be not merely heterosexual, but a heterosexual woman in terms of dressing and playing the feminine, deferential role required of "real" women.
Id. at 41-42.
" Interview with Joseph Steffan, former Midshipman, United States Naval
Academy, in Hartford, Conn. (Feb. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Steffan Interview].
Steffan's observation echoes Professor Thomas' account of the role that homophobic
violence-whether realized physically or verbally-plays in the oppression of gay
men and lesbians.
The terroristic dimensions of homophobic violence compel us to understand it as a mode of power. To put the point in slightly different terms,
homophobic violence is a form of "institution." . . . Homophobic violence

is a social activity "structured by rules that define roles and positions,
powers and opportunities, thereby distributing responsibility for consequences."
Thomas, supra note 8,at 1467 (quoting Claudia Card, Rape as a Terrorist Institution, in VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND JusTIcE 296, 297-98 (R.G. Frey & Christopher
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Academy in 1987 after revealing that he was gay. He unsuccessfully challenged the blanket-exclusion policy that preceded
Dont Ask, Don't Tell. Almost ten years after being formally
separated from the military, Steffan's demeanor, appearance
and surroundings are still highly ordered and efficient. Recalling the atmosphere of the Naval Academy, he describes the
frequency with which he found it difficult not to 'Join in on the
joke" when his peers would make homophobic comments because he could not give an honest account of his objections to
such remarks without revealing his own sexual orientation.
One incident in particular stood out in his mind during our
interview.
I served at times on a battalion performance board-a board that
reviewed and monitored the quality of individuals' work in the battalion. At one point, the board had to review the performance of a
particular midshipman who was not doing very well. When the midshipman showed up for his review hearing, he had his hair parted
straight down the middle. Another member of the Board-a senior
battalion commander-took one look at him and said, "Go back and
comb that part out of your hair, you look like a fucking faggot!" In
that context, there was no way that I could object to a comment like
that without calling my own sexual orientation into question. For
that matter, I couldn't have explained why I found the comment
inappropriate and offensive without explaining that I was gay. I had
to continue with the review and act like I thought that telling someone that he looks like a "faggot" was an appropriate way to dress
him down.'

W. Morris eds., 1991)).
' See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
' Steffan Interview, supra note 36. Michelle Benecke, the Executive Director of
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, confirms that Steffan's experience is a
common one:
It's not enough, even, to be silent in the face of anti.gay harassment;
they also have to participate or they're going to be thought to be gay.
You cannot be neutral. When you're neutral, people notice. This is an
environment where people work together very closely to accomplish a
mission. If people are trying to mask a life or pretend they don't have
one, it sticks out like a sore thumb. You have to affirmatively invent a
heterosexual life. Part of that means joining in on the harassment that is
about you.
Telephone Interview with Michelle Benecke, Executive Director, Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network (Apr. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Benecke Interview]. Professor
Marc Fajer has made similar observations. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender.Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. %And L. REV. 511, 592 (1992). See also STUDS
TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR: AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWo 180 (1984);
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Incidents like the one that Steffan relates-and the kinds
of interactions that Thorne, Hillman and Anonymous Officer
Number One describe as taking place in the workplace, in
recreational spaces and during off-hours-combine to form a
pervasive, unstructured background against which anything
other than an explicitly avowed heterosexual identity would
stand out in sharp relief. Feminist theorist Monique Wittig has
observed that "to live in society is to live in heterosexuality.... Heterosexuality is always already there within all men-

tal categories."" Whether gay and lesbian servicemembers
must affirm a heterosexual identity in words-as, frequently,
they must-or whether their enforced silence is loud enough to
claim the "default characterization" 4" of heterosexual identity
that most conversations offer, the background of social relations in the military, as in most other contexts, is one of presumptive, compulsory heterosexuality.
The more structured activities of military existence are no
less rife with occasions in which servicemembers are forced to
make explicit, public affirmations of their sexual identities.
Formal social events constitute perhaps the most important
example of such a structured activity. Dances, balls and formal
dinners are a regular and central element of the social life of
every branch of the armed forces. Among officers, attendance
at such events is necessary in order to enjoy any hope of advancement within the ranks. Every individual interviewed for
this Article, without exception, made reference to this dynamic
and described the conflicts that formal social events create for
gay and lesbian servicemembers living inside the mandatory
closet of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. Anonymous Officer
Number One's account is typical.
The service tends to be a fairly tight-knit environment-you socialize with the people that you work with, especially when you're stationed overseas. Every time there's a social event-and there tend to
be at least two formal events every year, along with lots of informal
get-togethers-there's interest on the part of your fellow officers

Halley, supra note 5,at 934, 947-48 & n.67.
39 MONIQUE

WITTIG, THE STRAIGHT MIND 40, 43 (1992); see also Michael
PLANET, at vii (Michael Warner ed.,

Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER
1993).
40

Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER

PLANET 82, 83 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
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about who you're going to bring. It's not necessarily prurient interest, it's just friendly and curious. They want to know whether he's
going to be military or non-military; if he's military, a fighter pilot is
a lot better then a JAG lawyer, if he's not military, is he a businessman or is he a car mechanic? I tend to go stag, just to avoid a lot of
these problems. But of course, going stag attracts attention, too.
When people ask, I tell them I choose to go stag because, as I get
more senior, the pool of available men gets smaller, and that I have
a blanket rule against dating men I work with. The other option is
to bring a safe date, but then people just continually ask you about
how things are going with that guy that you brought to the dance,
so it doesn't really avoid the problem.

Tracy Thorne spoke in his interview of the consequences of not

making appearances at such events.
Formal events are definitely a major part of a military career. If
you're not seen going out to the Officer's Club on a somewhat regular basis, if you're not attendiAg the Intruder Ball,' if you're not
attending Dress Messes, eventually thats going to cut into you. Yoh
have to be a "team player" in order to advance. A [gay] friend of
mine who's in the Marine Corps knows a lesbian couple, and one of
them has agreed to attend functions with him on a regular basis,
just because you need that in order to advance.'

Former Navy Lieutenant Paul Thomasson has similar

stories to relate. Thomasson, a highly decorated and widely
praised Naval officer, was separated and discharged after he
came out of the closet immediately following the effective date
of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. He challenged the constitutionality of the policy in federal court, ultimately losing his
case before the assembled judges of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.' Thomasson now lives in Washington State and remains unabashedly angry at the treatment that he received,
both in federal court and in the press, following his separation

Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35.
The Intruder Ball was the premier social event at Virginia Beach, as Thome
had explained earlier in his interview: "We had a huge banquet every year called
the 'Intruder Ball,' because the plane that we flew was called the A-6 Intruder. It
was the biggest social event of the year-a must-attend." Thorne Interview, supra
note 32.
Thorne Interview, supra note 32.
"See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
41
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and discharge. That sentiment is apparent in his tone and demeanor as he recalls some of the details of formal social events
in the Navy.
There unquestionably is overt pressure to engage in unit functions. I
can remember one of my commanders demanding that I go to a
"dining out,"--one of the formal officers' dining occasions. As usual, I
didn't want to go because of the "date" problem, but with the commander demanding that I go, I couldn't just not show up. This particular time, though, I had another excuse I could use. Some of the
guys in the squadron had made a horrible international faux pas
recently-[behaved really badly on a trip to Japan] ... -so I told
my commander that I was disgusted at the ward room for their
behavior and I intended to boycott the event to upbraid the squadron. So that wasn't quite a lie, that time-I just made a much bigger
deal of this other incident than I ever would have otherwise. Of
course, my commander was very angry-when a commander says
you should go to a dining out and you refuse, you had better have a
good excuse. I was fortunate; had I performed less well at my job,
my refusal would have hurt me, and I was just fortunate that I was
a top performer.' 5

Formal social events are perhaps the most visible among
those structured activities in the military that force
servicemembers to make statements about their sexual orientation, but they certainly are not the only such activities to
raise the issue. While Elizabeth Hillman has stories of her own
to relate concerning social events,46 she provides an account of
another required activity in the military that involves somewhat less pageantry.
Women in the service have to go to a gynecologist and get a pap
smear done, at least once a year. One standard question that the
gynecologist has to ask is, "What form of birth control are you currently using?" Obviously, you couldn't just say, "None'--I don't think
it was even an option on the form. For a straight woman, that would
be crazy. You had to make up a more believable response. You also
couldn't really claim to be using one of the safer methods of birth

Telephone Interview with Paul Thomasson, former Lieutenant, United States
Navy (Apr. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Thomasson Interview].
46 As

Hillman said at one point:

Formal events-dances, or what have you-are a standard thing that
every unit has. Everyone goes, and everyone is expected to bring a date.
Every time it comes up, if you go without a date, or if you don't go at
all, people ask questions-it raises eyebrows. So some gay people bring
fake dates to quell suspicions.
Hillman Interview, supra note 34.

1997]

U.S. MILITARY'S DON'T ASE, DON'T TELL POLICY

1161

control, [since those might be relevant to health issues that your
gynecologist would want to know about.] ... Personally, I would say
"abstinence" or "rhythm," as would some other lesbians I know, and
we would have to go through sessions where the gynecologists would
explain how risky those methods were, ask us whether the problem
was that
we felt uncomfortable with condoms or the pill, and so
7
forth

Perhaps the greatest impact that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy has is not to be found in structured activities or in casual social settings, but within the confines of gay
servicemembers' families and their close fiendships with their
fellow soldiers. Because members of the armed forces are considered to be on duty at all times, the policy forbids them from
ever speaking truthfully about their identities, even in private
moments." While it is sometimes possible for gay
' Hillman Interview, supra note 34. See also SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMNG: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'r ASK, DON'T

TELL, DON'r PURSUE," at 6 (1997) [hereinafter SLDN REPORT] (The services ...
have reportedly instituted the disturbing practice of requiring health care providers
in the military and those contracted to the military to turn in gay servicemembers
who seek their help in private counseling sessions.").
"The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy applies to servicexnembers twenty-four hours
a day. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)-(10) (1997). This means that even a private acknowledgment by a gay servicemember of his sexual orientation, if discovered, can
trigger a separation proceeding under the policy. See, eg., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
932 ("[Slervice members who have not publicly declared their homosexuality are
nevertheless subject to discharge if they have made private statements to that
effect, when those statements are brought to the attention of commanding officers ... ."). As Servicemembers Legal Defense Network reports:
In their zealous pursuit of suspected gay military members Pentagon
officials have expanded "Don't Tell" in ways that most Americans are not
aware, to include private statements to family members, close friends,
doctors and psychologists. Servicemembers must keep their sexual orientation an absolute secret, hidden even from their fiamilies, or risk investigation and discharge.
SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 5-6.
In her recent Article, Professor Halley quotes from a memorandum that the
Judge Advocate General's office has distributed to Air Force investigators to guide
them in gathering information once they have begun a formal investigation.
Halley's research seems to corroborate SLDN's conclusions:
"If acts or other military members are discovered during the proper
course of [an] investigation.... appropriate action may be taken....
Has the member told any of his family members?... Has the member
been dating anybody (opposite or same sex)? How frequently has the
member dated? How recently? How can these people be contacted?...
Did the member belong to any homosexual student organizations at
school? If so, which? How can other members of the organization, who
knew of his membership, be contacted?"
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servicemembers to avoid formal or social situations where they
would otherwise be forced to put on a public appearance of heterosexuality, it is almost impossible to prevaricate in such a
manner with close, intimate friends-and, of course, it is all
the more painful to try. For some gay servicemembers, this can
mean not forming close friendships at all, as Paul Thomasson
explains.
When you're not having to lie actively, you spend your time avoiding

the questions or changing the subject. The result is that-OK, if I
look at gay people whom I know in the military, many of them are
the over-achievers, the best and brightest, et cetera. A third to a
half of the Joint Chiefs of Staff interns were gay when I was there.
They got there because they had no life and poured all of their efforts into their jobs-to the point of having to avoid making too close
attachments at work. You don't really get close to people when you
can't speak freely with them."9

The experience of Anonymous Officer Number Two comports with Thomasson's observation. Anonymous Officer Number Two is a senior command officer and is still a member of
the armed forces. He asked that his precise rank and the
branch of the armed forces in which he serves not be revealed,
as that information might suffice to identify him and render
him vulnerable to reprisals. He is also the only gay
servicemember interviewed for this Article who unapologetically approves of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. His interview
thus provided a rare and valuable perspective on the effects of
the policy. Anonymous Officer Number Two has kept his personal life and his professional life in the armed forces completely separate, living in "many little rooms," as he puts it."°
He has segregated the different parts of his life to such an
extent that, by his own account, he has formed no open and
lasting friendships with straight colleagues in the armed forces, despite a lifetime spent in military service.

Halley, supra note 9, at 213 (quoting Department of the Air Force, Headquarters
USAF/JAG, memorandum for all Staff Judge Advocates and Military Judges, Re:
Commander Inquiries on Members Stating They are Homosexual, Nov. 3, 1993;
and id., attachment 2, "Sample Questions for Inquiry Concerning Member who
States He is Homosexual After Receiving Advanced Education Benefits.").
Thomasson Interview, supra note 45.
5o Interview with Anonymous Officer Number Two, Senior Command Officer,
United States Military, at an undisclosed location (July 19, 1997).
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I've always been absolutely divorced, my sexual life from my professional life.... The greatest "sin" is the sin of omission sometimes,
so I just omit talking about my personal life to anyone in the military, in my professional life."

Anonymous

Officer

Number Two, unlike the other

servicemembers interviewed for this Article, has found this

social privation to be agreeable.52
Most gay and lesbian servicemembers do form close friendships, however, and those friendships can occasion some of the
greatest pain that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy inflicts. As
discussed above, gay and lesbian servicemembers often go to
great lengths to avoid social functions so as not to appear conspicuously single. Anonymous Officer Number One explains
that, while such strategies and "cover stories" may serve to
deflect casual inquiries, they do not help in her interactions
with close friends.
There are friends in my life-men and women-who are simply
concerned about me because I am not dating somebody. Do I have
somebody to take care of me? Am I lonely? Is there someone in my
life to help me out? These friends are just expressing their concern,
but I can't tell them the truth. I either tell them that rm not interested in dating right now-that I don't have time for a man in my
life, something like that-or else I invent a long-distance boyfriend.
When your friends are persistently concerned about you, you have to
tell them something.'

Michelle Benecke confirms that this experience is a com-

Id. In contrast, Anonymous Officer Number Two has found opportunities to
develop friendships-and more-with gay servicemembers. As he explained: "I had
a lover who was my 'personal assistant' for eleven years and lived with me in a
military home. Nobody ever questioned it. His presence isn't even on my record.
My sexuality just had nothing to do with my career."
Id.
52As he said at one point during our interview:
I'm not "gay," Im homosexual, and there's a big difference... If
you come to my home, you'll see there's nothing about it thats 'gay,"
and these "gay activists" that go around demanding "gay rights! really
disgust me.... I knew what I was getting into when I went in [to the
military]. I didn't join the [armed forces] to get a date.... rll retire
with a pension of $120,000-you tell me what the payoff is. Do I feel
deprived? No.... Would I do it all over again? Absolutely, and I wouldn't do anything differently.
Id.
's Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35.
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mon one. Benecke served in the Army for six years, leaving the
service in 1989 with the rank of Captain. She is now the Executive Director of Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, the
organization that serves as the primary resource in the United
States for gay and lesbian servicemembers, offering both counseling and legal advice. Benecke reports that almost every
client she sees comes to her organization after the policy has
provoked an unbearable ethical dilemma. In the majority of
cases, this ethical dilemma grows out of a forced separation
from close friends or family. In fact, in Benecke's experience,
the problem is most acute during one of the times when family
and friends are most important: the holiday season.
[W]hen people are deployed, gay people can't even be honest in any
communication with anyone at home, unlike heterosexual soldiers,
because everyone's mail is censored and their telephone calls are
monitored. These people are not able to be out to their families because of DADT; they can't be out with their loved ones because of
DADT; and they have to face the prospect of losing their lives in
service of their country. Right around the holidays, when people are
just coming back, we get a big spate of calls from people trying to
figure out what to do.54

Sometimes, gay and lesbian servicemembers find the prospect of lying to their close friends too painful to bear. They
resolve to tell the truth, despite the enormous risk to their
careers, their futures, and their safety. Elizabeth Hillman
recalls the time that she was faced with this difficult choice.
I had a close friend-let's call him "Ric ]-who worked in the same
office I did at Colorado Springs. [Rick] came into work one day with
a sort of far-off look on his face and asked me, completely out of the
blue, "Beth, when was the last time you were in love-I mean, really, head-over-heels in love?" It was a totally innocent, friendly question-he might even have meant it to be a little flirtatious. I
blanched, had no idea what to say in response. The truth was that I
had recently met [the woman with whom I'm now sharing my life]
and fallen head-over-heels in love with her, but I wasn't allowed to
tell him that. I managed to stutter some noncommittal answer and
change the subject, but I felt extremely uncomfortable with that response. [Rick] was a friend, and I didn't like lying to him, for any
reason. It finally led me to come out of the closet to him a few days
later. I sat down with him to have a talk about our earlier conversation, and I told him, "I didn't quite know what to say, because I'm in

"

Benecke Interview, supra note 38. See also Fajer, supra note 38, at 597.
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love right now, but its not with a man.' z

What price does the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy exact from
gay and lesbian servicemembers when it forces them to choose
between telling lies about themselves and risking the sacrifice
of their careers and their safety? The answer must necessarily
be different for every individual. Even so, it would not be overstating the case to say that it is the rare gay or lesbian soldier

for whom that toll is not a heavy one. Anger, quiet resentment,
and sincere regret over the false identities they have been
forced to adopt were common among the servicemembers who
agreed to be interviewed for this Article. The armed forces are

organized around an ethic of honor and respect. Being compelled to lie about the most personal aspects of one's life to the
friends and associates who are supposed to be one's closest

allies in guarding that ethic cannot help but do damage to a
servicemember's spirit and her sense of self. Perhaps nothing could provide a more appropriate illustration of this price
than the words of a servicemember who is still living under the
onus of that compelled dishonesty on a daily basis. Anonymous
Officer Number One tells the following story of her life under
the policy.
The job that I'm in now is one thats designated "high security." As
part of my interview for my security clearance, I was asked to rate
myself as to how honest of a person I am, on a scale from one to ten.
My first reaction was, well, I don't believe in absolutes, but I think

Hillman Interview, supra note 34.
Indeed, Professor Halley invites us to reflect seriously upon the extent to
which our creation of a public identity can become constitutive of the entirety of
our social existence. She argues that we do not merely become less honest when

we must lie about who we are-we become less ourselves, in social as well as legal
intercourse.
[Hiomosexuals who experience their sexual desire as immutably oriented towards persons of their own sex nevertheless may be coerced to pretend that
they conform to the norm of heterosexuality. Such a result is no mere fib: it
is a change. To be sure, what has changed is not the supposed essence of
-sexual orientation, but the representation of it available for social interpretation. But essences, conceding for a moment their existence, are not visible to
legislatures, judges, employers, or police. Social agents work with social meaning; the fairness and indeed the constitutionality of their acts must be measured in the context of the practical, not the ideal, epistemology of their
decisionmaking.
Halley, supra note 5, at 934 (citation omitted). See also Fader, supra note 38, at
596-97 (discussing impact of dishonesty and prevarication upon closeted gay men
and lesbians).
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I'm a very honest person; so I rated myself a nine. But then, as I
was walking out of my interview, I thought, how could I possibly
have rated myself a nine, this whole thing is a lie. I normally am
such an honest person, but the military requires me to lie about this
one part of my life that's so important. [She pauses.] I got my security clearance. 7

Stories like these might properly shape one's assessment
of the wisdom of Don't Ask, Don't Tell as a matter of policy,
but it is not for that purpose that they are recounted here.
They are recounted because understanding these stories is a
prerequisite to producing a meaningful constitutional analysis
of the policy, whatever the ultimate conclusion of that analysis
might be. It is not simply the case that the interest of gay and
lesbian servicemembers in not being compelled to make false
affirmations of their identity has been undervalued in judicial

review of the policy; it has been entirely overlooked. These
stories provide the tools with which to begin the necessary,
formal inquiry into the legal significance of that interest.

II.

SILENCE AS SPEECH

A. The Value of Silence
The expressive power of the silence of gay and lesbian
servicemembers is central to the operation of the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy. To understand why this is so, it is necessary
to understand the nature of the value structure that the
military's policy was designed to defend. In his classic essay,
Nomos and Narrative," Robert Cover has offered a frame-

" Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35. As Professor Halley has
suggested, such deception can threaten more than a gay person's honesty and
integrity;, it can threaten her very sense of self. Halley describes the effects of a
policy requiring mandatory dismissal of C.I.A. agents who admit to being gay, and
the D.C. Circuit opinion (affirmed by the Supreme Court) that upheld it:
[The opinion] opens a pocket of legal protection for individuals who obey
a prohibition on homosexuality not by eschewing homosexual acts or
rejecting a homosexual subjective identity, but by appearing straight. One
cost to them of accepting that protection is that they must also accept
the public meaning of their equivocal position-the court's equation of
their closetedness with the assumption that they have internalized the
substantive determination that homosexuality is degrading to them.
Halley, supra note 5, at 958.
5 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and
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work within which to describe the norms and value structures
of a community. Cover's approach looks to the depth of the
commitment that a community demonstrates in defending a
particular set of values or a particular, narrow definition of
membership. As one paradigm, Cover identifies communities
that embrace a diversity of individuals and institutions among
their members and are structured around the enforcement of
rule-based norms, exhibiting only a shallow, thin commitment
to any particular moral or ethical precepts. He describes such
groups as "imperial" in nature and offers the State-and, more
broadly, legal communities-as the most visible examples."
In contrast, Cover describes what he calls the "paideic" community: a group that is characterized by a deeper form of commitment, one whose reason for existing centers around a particular conception of the good, a deeply held value structure, or
a nonpluralistic definition of membership.O Cover suggests
that paideic communities-which might include groups defined
by their religious, cultural, or ethnic affiliations-are the most
important sites for the creation of cultural meaning. As he
puts it, such communities constitute the source of those "narratives that imbue [the legal] precepts [of modern, "imperial"
nation-states] with rich significance."
The institution of the military challenges the fixity of the
distinction between the imperial and the paideic-and, concomitantly, the fixity of the distinction between pluralistic State
institutions, on the one hand, and communities with deeplyheld commitments to particular cultural values, on the other. 2 In form, the American military is, fundamentally, a
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
" Cover writes:

In [the "imperial"] model, norms are universal and enforecd by institu-

tions. They need not be taught at all, as long as they are effective. Discourse is premised on objectivity-upon that which is external to the
discourse itself. Interpersonal commitments are weak, premised only upon
a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that
would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the impartial
and neutral application of norms.
Id. at 13.
As Cover puts it: "[Tlhe term ['paideic'] suggests: (1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal way of being educated into this
corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as the individual
and his community work out the implications of their law." Id. at 12-13.
61 Id.

at 16.

Cover recognizes that, in practice, these categories ordinarily are not realized

1168

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1141

pluralistic institution. Unlike the armies of nobility in medieval Europe, where the honor of professional military service
was reserved for the wealthy and the powerful,' the U.S. military embraces the principle that underlies most public institutions in America: Applicants are to be judged on their qualifications alone, and all those who are qualified are at least eligible to participate.' To be sure, the qualifications and requirements of service in the military interfere with servicemembers'
deeply-held personal commitments, more so than do the requirements of any other public institution in America. The Supreme Court has observed that the armed forces constitute "a
specialized society"65 that requires "instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps"66 in aid of effective military service, even though these values sometimes require
servicemembers to accept compromises in their ability to demonstrate their commitment to their paideic communities. It is
for this reason that the Court accords great deference to the
military whenever individuals bring claims under the First

in "pure" form; he states: "Of course, no normative world has ever been created or
maintained wholly in either the paideic or the imperial mode. I am not writing of
types of societies, but rather isolating in discourse the coexisting bases for the
distinct attributes of all normative worlds." Id. at 14. Indeed, Cover goes on to
acknowledge the danger that the State poses when it embraces "paideic" commitments, and he praises West Virginia v. Barnette and other cases for the
protections they provide from that danger. See id. at 61 ("Certain decisions have
acknowledged the dangerous tendencies of a statist paideia and marked its boundaries through formal specification of the limits of public meaning.").
63 See, e.g., F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 16-19 (1952).
" In the Federal Constitution, this foundational norm finds expression in the
Equal Protection Clause and in the abolition of Titles of Nobility and Bills of
deny to any
Attainder. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. art. I, § 9, cl.
8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States."); id. art. I, § 9, cl.
3 ("No Bill of Attainder ...
shall be passed."). The ideal of equality of opportunity for qualified applicants has consistently shaped the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of individual rights. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), for example, the Court struck down a California affirmative action program on the grounds that the program left no opportunity for white applicants to compete for certain admission seats, regardless of how
the qualifications for those admission seats were defined. "No matter how strong
their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential
for contribution to educational diversity," the Court explained, white applicants
"are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
groups for the special admission seats." Id. at 319.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).

19971

U.S. MILITARY'S DONTASR DONT TELL POLICY

1169

Amendment, the Constitution's primary source of protection to
paideic communities.' Even so, the military ordinarily administers even its most invasive restrictions in what Cover would

call a "statist" or "imperialist" manner: It requires that all
servicemembers satisfy the same neutral standards of ability,
appearance, obedience and respect. In according deference to
the military in its Speech and Religion Clause analysis, the
Court has taken pains to reiterate that the First Amendment
still applies to limit the actions of the military, and it has
consistently demanded even-handedness in the definition and
administration of military regulations.'
In substance, however, the American military has exhibited a deep and consistent commitment to a norm that runs
counter to the otherwise pluralistic tenor of its criteria for
admission and service. The military is the primary site for the
definition of manhood in American culture, and military service is the most important opportunity for citizens to attain to
that virtue. Professor Kenneth Karst has written about the
The First Amendment, of course, guards the expressive, religious and
associational interests of the citizenry. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."); see also Cover, supra note 58, at 26-33, 60-67 (dicussing importance
of First Amendment protection of speech, association and religion to existence of
paideic communities).
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (CMlembers of the military
services are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment... ."); see also
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ('[The special] aspects of military life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the
guarantees of the First Amendment."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)
("[T]he members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by
the First Amendment."); cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.. 296, 304 (1983) ("[Olur
citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have
doffed their civilian clothes.") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)).
' See, e.g., Brown, 444 U.S. at 358 n.15 (upholding regulation requiring official
approval of petitions circulated on Air Force bases, but explaining. "Commanders
sometimes may apply [such regulationsi irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily,
thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the First Amendment.") (internal quotation omitted); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (requiring that regulations
restricting political demonstrations on military property be "objectively and
evenhandedly applied"); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring) (providing fifth vote to uphold application of Air Force dress code to yarmulke wom by
observant Jew because "the rule that is challenged in this case is based on a
neutral, completely objective standard-visibility").
7
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American military's commitment, throughout its history, to the
specification and enforcement of the qualities that are constitutive of manhood."0 Those qualities, he points out, have been
far from pluralistic. The military's definition of masculine virtue-a definition that has played a unique role in setting standards for citizenship status in America7 1 -has repeatedly
found expression in discriminatory restrictions on the qualifications for military service. Indeed, Karst argues that this
institutional "pursuit of manhood" has been the primary cultural motivation for most of the major instances of discrimination in military personnel policies. During the period when
African-American men were still openly dismissed in American
popular culture as unacceptable exemplars of masculine virtue,
the military defended that racist construction of manhood, first
by excluding blacks from military service altogether, then by
segregating them into second-class units.7 2 Similarly, Karst
argues, the exclusion and segregation of women has been the
result of the military's commitment to a vision of masculine
virtue that excludes women from its core. For many years,
women were entirely barred from military service. Eventually,
the claims of women to equal citizenship status gained sufficient force that the military, in its capacity as a pluralistic
institution, felt compelled to make an accommodation and
admit them among its ranks. Nonetheless, women continue to
be largely excluded from active combat, the aspect of military

70 See

Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 500 (1991). For a further exploration of the
importance of military service to defining the virtue of manhood, see, for example,
RANDY SHiLTs, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS & GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY,
VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 28-36 (1993).
71 See Karst, supra note 70, at 502-03, 505-06. Professor Leisa Meyer characterizes the importance of military service to the definition of the rights of citizens
in the following terms:

[B]ecause the military is a critical bastion of state power and service

within it a determinant of the rights of citizens, allowing heterosexual
women, lesbians, and gay men to participate within it fully and without
harassment or discrimination increases expectations that those same
groups will be treated with fairness and respect in the public sector.
LEISA D. MEYER, CREATING G.I. JANE: SEXUALITY AND POWER IN THE WOMEN'S
ARMY CORPS DURING WORLD WAR II, at 1 (1996).
72 See Karst, supra note 70, at 510-22.
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service that serves as the primary site for the definition of
manhood, permitting the military to maintain its commitment
to traditional masculine virtues. 73
Karst concludes that the policy that excluded all gay men
and lesbians from military service sprang from the same
source. The military has defended a conception of manhood
that defines gay men as lesser, degenerate versions of their
heterosexual peers and defines lesbians as aberrant, ambiguous transgressors of essential gender boundaries.7 ' Such a
vision of manhood depends upon the categorical exclusion of
gay identity.7' The acknowledged and open presence of gays
and lesbians in military service would threaten that vision.
Therefore, heterosexuality became a necessary qualification for
military service. As Karst explains:
For those who want to keep the public's gaze fixed on "the manliness of war," the tensions of male bonding demand a clear expression of the services' rejection of homosexuality. This expression is
not just a by-product of the policy that purports to exclude gay men
and lesbians from the armed forces; it is the policy's main function.
When a gay soldier comes to the Army's official attention, the real
threat is not the hindrance of day-to-day operations, but rather the
tarnishing of the Army's traditionally masculine image. '

Under the blanket exclusion of gay men and lesbians that was
the subject of Karst's investigation, the policy's defense of masculinity was straightforward and unmediated. The explicit
requirement of heterosexuality as a qualification for service
operated to secure the traditional definition of manhood to

See Karst, supra note 70, at 523-45. Professor Meyer provides a description
of the military at around the time that women were first admitted:
ITIhe ideological construction of "soldier" as a man with a weapon
who fights, and the military as a preeminently masculine institution,
continued [when women were first admitted to the armed forces] to include all white men, whether or not they saw combat, and black men
who were active combatants, while excluding all women entirely.
MEYER, supra note 71, at 12-13; see also MEYER, supra note 71, at 11-32.
"' See Karst, supra note 70, at 546-47; see also ALLAN BERUBD, THE HISTORY
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR H at 13-14 (1991).

7' As Professor Cover writes: "The radical instability of the paideic nomos forces intentional communities--communities whose members believe themselves to
have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their common lives - to
maintain their coherence as paideic entities by expulsion and exile of the potent
flowers of normative meaning." Cover, supra note 58, at 15-16.
'' Karst, supra note 70, at 545-46.
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which the military was committed. It did so, however, at the
expense of the pluralistic values that the military, as a State
institution, has an obligation to promote.
The current policy originated as an accommodation to
those pluralistic values. In 1993, Navy Lieutenant Keith
Meinhold challenged the military's blanket exclusion of gay
men and lesbians in a federal district court in California. The
district court struck down the policy on equal protection
grounds, reinstated Meinhold, and issued a nationwide injunction to prevent the military from discharging any other gay
servicemembers.77 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
quashed the injunction and affirmed Meinhold's reinstatement
on much narrower grounds. The circuit court construed the
policy to require a conduct violation in order to support a discharge, avoiding an interpretation that would have authorized
discharges on the basis of status alone.7" The court went on to
suggest that a policy banning gay people from service solely on
the basis of their sexual orientation would present serious
constitutional problems."
In response, the military sought to craft a policy that
would satisfy its obligations as a pluralistic institution while
still allowing it to continue to defend a heterosexual vision of
manhood. What resulted was Don't Ask, Don't Tell, permitting
gay people to serve but forcing them to do so in silence. Under
the new policy, the military is able to defend its commitment
to heterosexual manhood precisely because it can rely upon
society's general presumption of heterosexuality to transform a
gay servicemember's silence into an affirmation of heterosexual
identity. The expressive power of silence in matters of sexual
identity thus permits the military to maintain its paradoxical
role as both an imperial public institution with pluralistic
standards of admission and a paideic community that creates
and defends a purely heterosexual vision of masculine virtue.

" See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1457-58 (C.D.
Cal. 1993), affd on different grounds, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
"8See Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478-80 (9th Cir.
1994).
7, See id. at 1476-77.
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By compelling gay servicemembers to remain silent about their
true identities, the policy requires them to embrace and affirm
that vision. This is the intended mode of the policy's operation."°
In calling for a recognition of the affirmative role that
silence plays in maintaining the value structure that underlies
the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, this Article embraces a project
similar to the one that Professor Jed Rubenfeld has advanced
in calling for a reconceptualization of the right to privacy."1
Rubenfeld has argued that "the fundamental right to privacy is
not to be found in the supposed fundamentality of what the
law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes.ss
Proscriptive models of the right to privacy, he explains, ultimately rest upon some theory of "personhood"-that is, an
account of which activities are "fundamental" to our concept of
personhood and, for that reason, should not ordinarily be subject to regulation by the State."0 Rubenfeld convincingly argues that such theories suffer from severe problems of definition and administration, inevitably producing intractable disputes over, for example, what parts of our identities are "fundamental,"' or how an "identity" (or an identifying trait) is to

" Compare Professor Halley's description of the holding of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), acffd in part,
rev'd in part on the other grounds, sub. norm Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047
(1987) in Halley, supra note 5, at 956-58. In Casey, the D.C. Circuit denied relief
to a gay agent of the C.I- who claimed that the agency's policy of denying security clearance (and employment) to gay people denied him due process of law. In
rejecting the agent's claim that the policy placed an impermissible stigma upon
him, Halley observes, the court gave a reading to the policy that purported to
demonstrate greater fidelity to the imperatives of fairness and due process but
that actually operated to define the agents interests out of existence:
The court purports to view the problem of stigma from Doe's point of
view: if he disclosed his homosexuality, he clearly sees nothing scandalous in it; and if he sees nothing scandalous in his homosexuality, he has
no liberty interest in evading its legal consequences. The apparent respect paid here to Doe!s self-conception and self-description is revealed as
a sham if we note the implication of the court's reasoning- a self-identifled homosexual in government employment, in order to retain a liberty
interest in his or her job, must (1) subjectively regard his or her homosexuality as degrading and (2) hide it.
Halley, supra note 5, at 957.
81 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
Id. at 739.
83 See id. at 738-39.
See id. at 754-70.

1174

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1141

be defined and limited.' As an alternative, Rubenfeld urges
us to examine the affirmative impact that a regulation has
upon its target when it affirmatively takes over their lives,
forcing them into certain narrow channels. For example, where
a woman's right to have an abortion is concerned, Rubenfeld
argues that "[w]omen should be able to abort their pregnancies
so that they may avoid being forced into an identity"-that of
motherhood---"not because they are defining their identities
through the decision itself."86 It is those laws that "tend to
take over the lives of the persons involved" 7-- to "occupy and
preoccupy" --that should require extraordinary justification
from the State and provoke searching judicial scrutiny. Thus,
Rubenfeld argues, to determine whether a law impermissibly
infringes upon an individual's right of privacy, we should ask
whether it "affirmatively and very substantially shape[s that]
person's life." 9
This Article meets Rubenfeld's challenge on different, but
related, doctrinal ground. It identifies the silence that the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy imposes upon gay servicemembers
as an attempt not merely to proscribe the expression of gay
identity in the military-Professor Karst's central insight 9 -but to require the affirmative expression of heterosexual identity by gay and straight servicemembers alike."
Under the terms of the policy, gay servicemembers are forced
to participate in the project of defining and reaffirming a value
structure that excludes them entirely from its core. Rubenfeld

See id. at 770-82.
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 782
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784.
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784.
8 Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 784.
9o See Karst, supra note 70, at 545-46.
91 Thus, in arguing that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was wrongly
decided, Rubenfeld writes:
We tend, in measuring [the] morality [of laws prohibiting homosexual
conduct], to form an image of either the homosexual imprisoned or the
homosexual forced to give up his sexual acts. We ought, however, to give
up the image of "the homosexual" in the first place and measure the law
instead in terms of its creation of heterosexuals (and, in a different way,
of homosexuals too) within the standardized parameters of a state-regulated identity.
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 801. See also Thomas, supra note 8, at 1497-98 (discussing Rubenfeld's treatment of Bowers)
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properly instructs us to ask what affirmative acts of speech the
forced silence of the policy imposes, and not merely what acts
of speech it proscribes.92
I See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 739. Having embraced the large-scale dimensions of Rubenfeld's project, I must register my dissatisfaction with his own
application of his thesis to anti-gay regulations. While his analysis contains hints
of a sophisticated understanding of the economy of public sexual identities in
which closeted gay people must trade, Rubenfeld nonetheless seems to have an
understanding of the impact gay people feel from restrictions on sexual intimacy
that is at once overbroad and under-inclusive. He writes:
[T]he prohibition against homosexual sex channels individuals' sexual
desires into reproductive outlets.... The proscription is against homosexual sex; the products are lives forced into relations with the opposite
sex that substantially direct individuals' roles in society and a large part
of their everyday existence.... [Tihe real force of anti-homosexual laws,
if obeyed, is that they enlist and redirect physical and emotional desires
that we do not expect people to suppress.
Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 800. This analysis is overbroad in the insularity that
it ascribes to the lives of gay men and women. It seems to assume that a gay
person's natural state of being is one in which 'relations with the opposite sex
are not "a large part of [one's] everyday existence." Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at
800. Unless Rubenfeld means to use "relations narrowly as a euphemism for
sex-which, clearly, he does not, see Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 799-801-then
he has a vision of how gay people lead their lives that is, to say the least, contestable. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1506-07 (criticizing Rubenfeld for simplistic
understanding of life-choices of gay men and lesbians).
More importantly, Rubenfeld's analysis is under-inclusive in that it steadfastly
refuses to allow the invasion into a gay person's intimate life that results from
restrictions on adult, consensual sexual behavior to enter into its calculus. Under
Rubenfeld's approach, such an invasion is prohibited, if at all, only by virtue of its
fortuitous congruence with the institution-channeling aspects of the restrictive
statute. This seems, fundamentally, to miss the point. In making this observation
(with its invocation of the 'fundamental'), I deliberately invite the rejoinder that
my criticism is simply a gesture toward the 'personhood' model of privacy analysis
that Rubenfeld has so cogently criticized. Nonetheless, insofar as Rubenfeld rests
his theory of privacy entirely on the capacity of a law to force an individual's life
into certain institutional channels, it is simply incomplete. For example, Rubenfeld
praises Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)-in which the Court held the
use of contraceptives by a married couple to merit protection under a right of
privacy--as a vindication of his own privacy theory. As in the case of abortion, he
explains, a contrary result would have meant forcing women to devote their lives
to motherhood. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 791. But does this suggest that,
where abortion is freely available to women, the use of contraception should no
longer receive privacy protection? Rubenfeld's own discussion of Griswold hints at
this result. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 791 ("At least at the time [Griswold]
was decided, when abortion was still generally prohibited, the ban on contraception
was equivalent in its positive aspect to enforced child-bearing.'). But to suggest
that the use of contraceptives is no longer a vital privacy right because women
can just go out and get abortions should make us recoil. And why? Because the
decision whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy is so personal and intimate
that it would be unacceptable to predicate a policy (or a constitutional analysis) on
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B. Silence as Speech
The maxim that silence can constitute speech is one that
pervades the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence-both in its Free Speech and Establishment Clause
cases. In analyzing the Court's treatment of this dynamic, it is
necessary at the outset to distinguish between two different
issues that the Court has considered regarding silence. These
might best be described as the issue of silence as a speech
interest, on the one hand, and silence as speech, on the other.
The distinction, in other words, is one between situations
where a claimant asserts an interest in remaining silent and
thereby not speaking, and situations where a claimant asserts
that his silence effectively constitutes speech. It is the latter
dynamic that drives the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. However,
the former situation is also important to the present inquiry.
The right not to speak is related to the jurisprudence of compelled affirmations embodied in West Virginia v. Barnette and
its progeny,93 and the Court has recognized that right as one
that enjoys dignity and force equal to that of the right to engage in affirmative expressive acts. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina," for example-a case
involving a state requirement that charities communicate certain information when making their requests for donations--Justice Brennan pronounced the frequently quoted
maxim that "the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of
speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both
what to say and what not to say."95 How this treatment of
silence as a speech interest fits in to the present inquiry will
be taken up later in the discussion of Barnette.6

an easy willingness to force women regularly to resort to abortion as a contraceptive method. Rubenfeld's theory of privacy offers no answer to this problem.
93 See Hunter, supra note 6, at 1719.
5' 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (Brennan, J.).

9 Id. at 796-97. See also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
256 (1974) (striking down Florida statute requiring newspaper to provide space for
response by those they editorially criticize and holding that "[t]he Florida statute
operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter").
" See infra Part IV.
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One of the paradigmatic analyses of communication by
silence involves the possibility of attribution or endorsement.
When two potential speakers enjoy a relationship with eachother that could lead an uninformed observer to assume that
the two are voluntarily affiliated-even if that relationship is
only an incidental or a spatial one-then the observer might
also attribute the remarks of one speaker to the other in the
absence of an express disclaimer. Where such a disclaimer is
impractical or impossible, there may be a danger that one
speaker will be forced to endorse, by her silence, the message
of the other.
The capacity of silence to constitute an affirmation in this
manner finds its clearest illustration in the Establishment
Clause context, in the case of Lee v. Weisman. In Weisman,
a young student successfully challenged the constitutionality of
a public school's decision to include a religious invocation as
part of the commencement ceremonies that it conducted during
graduation. The school system of Providence, Rhode Island had
made a practice of inviting local members of the clergy to deliver prayers to its graduating middle and high school students. Students were admonished to stand and maintain a
respectful silence while the clergyman delivered his invocation.
Deborah Weisman, a student at a middle school in Providence,
claimed that the practice violated the Establishment Clause in
two respects. First, she maintained that the State's involvement with religion in the commencement ceremonies, which
included a measure of editorial control over the invocation, was
so pervasive as to create a "state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise" and thus to constitute an impermissible governmental endorsement of religion." Second, Weisman argued
that the nature of the ceremony was such that she was effectively forced to endorse and participate in the prayer through
her silence, and that such forced participation in a religious
exercise was antithetical to the requirements of the Establishment Clause.9 The majority in Weisman accepted both of

97

505 U.S. 577 (1992).

93 Id. at 587.
9Id. at 593-94.
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these arguments in awarding Deborah Weisman her victory. It
is the second argument that is of particular importance for
present purposes.'
Lee v. Weisman is remarkable for its candid and explicit
reliance on the operation of subtle cultural forces-social conventions-in recognizing the burden that the State-sponsored
invocation in that case placed on the students' right of religious freedom. If the students in Providence had actually been
coerced into making a plain statement of their endorsement of,
and participation in, the religious invocation, such coercion
would clearly have violated the Establishment Clause. The
Court's ruling rested on its recognition that silence can sometimes have the same meaning and effect as a plain statement
of this type. The majority observed that "in our culture standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view or
simple respect for the views of others.""' Here, the Court
found that the State forced the students to convey a message
of participation and endorsement merely by pressuring them to
remain silent. That message, though perhaps not without ambiguity, was nonetheless sufficiently intelligible to render the
ceremony and invocation constitutionally infirm. The Court
explained:
There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at
the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the rabbi's prayer. That was the very

point of the religious exercise. It is of little comfort to the dissenter,
then, to be told that for her the act of standing or remaining in
Lest there be any ambiguity on the point, I do not mean to suggest that the
actual holding in Lee v. Weisman is applicable to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy.
The Establishment Clause raises unique constitutional concerns, for it prohibits the
government from engaging in an entire category of expression (religious speech)-a
proscription that runs directly contrary to the norms embodied in the First
Amendments Free Speech Clause. As the Court observed in Weisman:
Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even when the government participates, for the very object of some of our most important
speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own....
The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship
that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment,
but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state
intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech
provisions.
Id. at 591. Lee v. Weisman is offered here, instead, for its clear recognition of the
capacity of silence to constitute an affirmative act of speech.
'0' Id. at 593.
10
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silence signifies mere respect, rather than participation. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in
this milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own
participation or approval of it."n

It is important to note that the perception with which the
Court is concerned here is that of the dissenter herself, whose
silence may create in her "a reasonable perception that she is
being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience
will not allow."' If a student's enforced silence in a ceremony like the one reviewed in Weisman can create the perception
in the student's own mind that she has endorsed and participated in a religious observance that violates her beliefs, then
such enforced silence can certainly create that impression in
the minds of others who observe her.'°
In its Speech Clause analysis, the Court has likewise taken cognizance of the potential for messages to be attributed
among speakers in this fashion. The case of Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston... pro102 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. See also id. at 592 ("What to most believers may seem
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect (othersl religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to
be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.").
103 Id. at 593.
104 Thus far, commentators seem largely to have overlooked the importance of
Lee v. Weisman for its contribution to the analysis of expressive silences. Rather,
most commentators have focused on the question of whether Weisman can be read
finally to have rejected the three-pronged test of Lemon u. Kurtzman in Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux,
1992 SuP. CT. REv. 123, 131 (arguing that Lee u. Weisman effectively rejected
Lemon test); Charles Fried, Forward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 68 n.374
(1995) ("It would seem that the clarion calls for the abandonment of Lemon have
finally been heard.") (citing Lee v. Weisman; Sherry, supra). At least one commentator has discussed Weisrnan's implications for the expressive power of silence,
albeit in a field very different from that of the present inquiry. In his Article,
Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MY
BILL RTs. J. 787 (1996), Robert Goldstein invokes Weisman's treatment of what he
calls the "captive audience" problem in analyzing the speech interests of doctors
who are subject to restrictions on disseminating abortion information. See id. at
847-48 & n.185. Goldstein then goes on to tie this problem of the "captive audience" to the First Amendment's injunction against compelled affirmations, whether
effectuated by compelled speech or by enforced silence. See id. at 853 ("[Wlhen
[an] individual assumes a professional or other work role, [Planned Parenthood v.
]Casey suggests that reasonable regulation may diminish or eliminate this right
not to be required to endorse-by words or silence-prescribed speech.").
100

115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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vides a ready example. The controversy in Hurley centered
around the participation of gay and lesbian marchers in the
Saint Patrick's Day Parade in Boston. In 1993, members of
GLIB,0 6 a support and advocacy group for gay, lesbian and
bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants, requested that the
group be allowed to march under its own banner at the parade.
The parade's private organizers, the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council, denied the group's request. In response,
GLIB invoked a Massachusetts public accommodations law and
obtained a state court injunction requiring the parade organizers to allow its members to march.0 7 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's ruling, but
the U.S. Supreme Court, led by Justice Souter, unanimously
quashed the injunction. The Court found, first, that "[plarades
are... a form of expression, not just motion,"' 8 and, second,
that forcing the parade organizers to admit an openly gay
contingent would alter the message that the organizers intended to communicate. As the Court put it:
[A] contingent marching behind [GLIB's] banner would at least bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual, and
the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view

that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members
of parade units organized around other identifying characteristics.
The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish

sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians .... ."'
Referring frequently to the case of West Virginia v. Barnette,
the Court held that it would constitute the most serious possible violation of the First Amendment to require the parade
organizers so to propound a message with which they disagreed.
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to

produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or,

"00
As the name of the case indicates, the group's full name is the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. See id. at 2341.
10" See id. at 2341-43. GLIB had marched in the parade in 1992, also on the
strength of a court order and against the wishes of the parade organizers. Their
participation that year was "uneventful." Id.
108Id. at 2345.
109Id. at 2348.
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indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis~n

0

Here, the "propounding" of the contested message was accom-

plished by the parade organizers' silence.
Having determined that parades constitute an expressive
activity with a sufficiently coherent message to warrant First
Amendment protection,"' the Court had to decide whether
GLIB's presence threatened to alter that message. The dynamic of silence-as-endorsement drove the Court's inquiry into the
relationship between parade participant and parade organizer.
"Parades and demonstrations," the Court observed, "... are
not understood to be ... neutrally presented or selectively

viewed."" Rather, the Court concluded, a parade speaks
with one voice: that of its organizer. This "univocal" character
of the parade renders impractical any disclaimer as to an
organizer's endorsement of a particular message in a parade.
The organizer is effectively disabled from expressing any dissent; hence, he is forced to endorse every message that the
individual parade units present. Exercising control over the
parade's composition, the Court explained, is the only effective
way to exercise control over the parade's message.
Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is under-

stood to contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly
there is no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow
any identity of viewpoints between themselves and the selected
participants. Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers
would be quite curious in a moving parade."

The holding in Hurley is entirely predicated upon this
dynamic of silence-as-endorsement. By the opinion's terms,
there would be no interference with the Council's message if
"GLIB's participation would [not] likely be perceived as having
resulted from the Council's customary determination about a
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of
presentation and quite possibly of support as well.""' A simiHurley, 115 S.Ct. at 2350.
m See id. at 2345-46.
112 Id. at 2349.
1
Id. (quotation omitted).
114Id. at 2348.
"'
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lar treatment of the expressive power of silence has deterthe outcome of many of the Court's Speech Clause casmined
5
es.1

The Court has also applied this common-sense understanding of the meaning and effect of silence outside the realm of
the First Amendment. A number of examples are to be found
in the law of evidence. One is the common-law doctrine of
"impeachment by silence." If a declarant has remained silent in
a situation where she might reasonably be expected to speak
or be forthcoming with certain information, that silence might
serve to impeach any related testimony that she later offers as
a witness. As the Court has pointed out, "[clommon law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact
naturally would have been asserted."" 6 The witness' past
failure to state a fact is treated as evidence that the witness
actually believes the converse of that fact to be true.
Similarly, an individual's failure to dispute a statement

...For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court invalidated a state ordinance that forced utility companies to bundle conservationist environmental literature with the bills that they mailed to their customers. The literature conflicted
with the companies' own viewpoints and, arguably, with their business interests.
The company succeeded in having the ordinance struck down on Speech Clause
grounds because of the possibility that the company's silence might be interpreted
as an endorsement of the literature. The Court found that the company "may be
forced either to appear to agree with [the literature] or to respond," and that the
State cannot so "compel . . . speakers to propound political messages." Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986) (plurality
opinion). Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (requiring owner of shopping mall to provide access for speakers and disallowing Speech
Clause claim of owner on grounds that owner "can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or
handbillers stand"); Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (disallowing claim of cable operators that "must-carry" provisions will lead to impermissible attribution of messages because, "[gliven cable's long history of serving as a
conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would
assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or
messages endorsed by the cable operator").
16 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980). See also 3A J. WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (1970). This maxim finds an ironic and unfortunate
counterpart in a recent series of cases in which the military has refused to believe
a servicemember's admission that he or she is gay without further "corroborating
proof." The military has apparently expressed a concern that a servicemember who
has never before given the military any reason to believe that he or she is gay
might make such an assertion "opportunistically," as a means of getting out of a
service commitment. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9.
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that is made in his presence may sometimes constitute evidence of his acquiescence in that statement. In particular, the
Court has suggested that such reticence is likely to be probative where accusations of wrongdoing go unanswered. Justice
Marshall explored this dynamic in United States v. Hale. 7
In Hale, a criminal defendant had refrained from offering exculpatory evidence that was in his possession when the police
first arrested him for a robbery, and the prosecution used the
defendant's earlier silence against him when he offered that
exculpatory evidence at trial. The Court held that the
defendant's failure to offer exculpatory evidence during a police
interrogation was not sufficiently probative to be used against
him on the stand, but it went on to discuss the circumstances

under which such a use of silence as evidence might be allowable.
Silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of
accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence
of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.1

As Justice Marshall's cautionary tone suggests, the cases
discussed in this section should not be read for the proposition
that silence always constitutes an affirmative endorsement of
some identity or belief. If that were so, then state officials
could not maintain decorum at public speeches or convocations
without threatening to "compel orthodoxy" and trench on constitutional interests-a result that would be as unnecessary as
it would be untenable."' What cases like Hurley and
'"

422 U.S. 171 (1975).

" Id. at 176. Of course, this line of cases implicates the criminal defendanes

Fifth Amendment right not to testify in a proceeding against him. See Grunewald
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (holding that defendants invocation of privilege against self-incrimination before grand jury cannot be used to impeach his
testimony at trial). These are not Speech Clause cases. Nonetheless, the Court's
treatment of silence as constituting an affirmative utterance in these cases relies
upon a common understanding of social interactions and not any particular analytical or constitutional framework. That treatment has transubstantive implications.
" As Justice Scalia colorfully writes in his dissent in Lee u. Weisman, "surely
'our social conventions'.., have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does
not stand on his chair and shout obscenities can reasonably be deemed to have
assented to everything said in his presence." Weisman, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Weisman require is an inquiry that is sensitive to the context
in which a contested silence appears. In Hurley, for example,
Justice Souter locates this inquiry in the nature of the relationship that exists between a speaker and a message. He
writes, "[Wihen dissemination of a view contrary to one's own
is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the
message is compromised."120 In this formulation, it is the existence of an "intimate connection" between the speaker and
the communication advanced that is the appropriate object of a
careful and context-sensitive inquiry.
Framed in more general terms, this requirement is familiar to First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has frequently noted that it has a responsibility to conduct a delicate
and fact-sensitive inquiry in order to determine the import and
meaning, in context, of the utterances that it is asked to review.' It is one of the distinctive features of the Court's
analysis in Speech Clause cases that it conducts a de novo review of findings of fact, even those made by state trial courts,
in the course of adjudicating litigants' free speech claims.'22
The obligation is one that "rests upon [the Court] simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to embrace."" = In Hurley, the
Court deployed these maxims to justify its rejection of the
Massachusetts trial court's finding that the Boston parade did
not constitute expressive activity meriting First Amendment
protection. The Justices looked to historical, judicial and
scholarly sources that treated parades as expressive public
spectacles, finding that the Massachusetts courts had undervalued the expressive importance of the Boston event." 5

120 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348.

.21See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County v. Umbehr, 116 S.
Ct. 2342, 2344 (1996) (acknowledging necessity for "fact-sensitive" review of record).
1
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (holding

that Court has obligation to "make an independent examination of the whole record . . .so as to assure [itself] that [the lower court's factual determination] does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression") (quotation

omitted).

12 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344.
124
2

See id. at 2344-46.
See id. at 2344-45 (discussing S. DAVIS,

PARADES AND POWER:

STREET
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While this type of inquiry is less attractive than one that can
rely upon bright lines and clear distinctions, that infirmity is
endemic to the field of First Amendment analysis as a whole.
To assert that an informed understanding of the lived expe-

rience of gay servicemembers is necessary in order properly to
analyze the effects of the silence that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell

policy imposes is to place that analysis squarely within a jurisprudential tradition that the Court has elevated to the status
of a "constitutional duty."'

Such an informed understanding of gay experience provides guidance in assessing the communicative weight of gay

servicemembers' compelled silence in the face of the constant
presumption of their heterosexuality. Justice Marshall's dictum
in Hale makes the point aptly. "Silence gains ... probative
weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since it is

assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be
more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation. " ' One
need not characterize the heterosexual presumption as an
"accusation" to recognize that it constitutes a pervasive and
forceful assertion about one of the most personal aspects of an

individual's life, one that any individual would "be more likely
than not to dispute [if it were] untrue."' Most frequently,
when a gay person chooses not to dispute that false presumption, she is operating under some form of compulsion.' Of-

THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA (1986); Gregory v. Chicago, 394
U.S. 111 (1969); and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)).
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344. Justice Souter chose this phrase advisedly. As
noted above, the Court reopens findings of fact made by federal district courts for
de novo review in First Amendment cases, despite the clear command of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that findings of fact made by district courts be set
aside only if they are clearly erroneous. See FED. R. CiV. P. 52(a). The impetus for
this overriding of a federal rule proceeds directly from the First Amendment. See
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344.
12 Hale, 422 U.S. at 176.
' Id- See also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 3
(1990) (" 'Closetedness' itself is a performance initiated as such by the speech act
of a silence.").
' For example, Professor Halley describes the plight of James Michael
McConnell, who was fired from his job as a college librarian for refusing to remain silent about his relationship with another man-an action upheld by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1971). Halley writes, "Rather than force a helpless university to blazon its
employee's political views, the court insists that the employee must remain silent
about them and, by semiotic default, proclaim the ubiquity and normalcy of het-
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ten, the compulsion arises from the fear of rejection and social
disapprobation that keeps many gay people in the closet for
large portions of their lives. In the case of the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell policy, however, no such reference to social forces is required, for the compulsion is the avowed purpose of the policy.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF AFFIRMATION AND IDENTITY

In order to analyze a restriction on an individual's ability
to give voice to her identity-and to assess the weight of the
burden that such a restriction might impose by compelling her
to affirm a false identity-it is important to distinguish between the regulation of the modes of expressing an identity, on
the one hand, and the regulation of identity itself, on the other. A restriction on one particular mode of expressing an identity will usually leave the speaker with ample alternative avenues for identifying herself. Thus, the silence that such a restriction requires ordinarily will not carry with it any forcibly
imposed, implicit message. It is the direct regulation of an
individual's identity that carries with it the greatest threat of a
compelled affirmation.
The case of Goldman v. Weinberger13 -- a military First
Amendment case-illustrates the effect of a regulation aimed
primarily at the modes of expression of an individual identity,
rather than the identity itself. Goldman, an ordained rabbi and
orthodox Jew, was a doctor and officer on active duty in the
Air Force. In 1981, he ran afoul of an Air Force dress regulation that prohibited servicemembers from wearing any unauthorized headgear, including the yarmulke that Goldman considered a necessary part of his religious observance. 131 After

erosexuality." Halley, supra note 5, at 971. See also Rich, supra note 35, at 22.
130 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
131 Goldman itself is framed primarily as a Free Exercise case. However, the
Court has consistently conflated Speech Clause and Religion Clause analysis in its
military cases, applying the same nebulous standard to all such claims. Thus, the
Court cites its military Speech Clause cases when conducting military Religion

Clause analysis, see, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-07 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417

U.S. 733 (1974)), and the Courts of Appeals have cited both types of cases, including Goldman, in their analysis of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. See, e.g.,
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 933 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (relying on
Goldman in analysis of Speech Clause claims). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 591 (1992) ("The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and
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receiving a reprimand and poor evaluation for the dress code
violation, Goldman brought suit, claiming that this application
of the code to an orthodox Jew violated the First Amendment.
The Court, per then-Justice Rehnquist, disallowed his claim.
The majority acknowledged that the wearing of a yarmulke
was "required by [Goldman's] religious beliefs" and that it constituted an important expressive act by which he sought to
identify himself as Jewish.132 Nonetheless, they found that
the military's interest in promoting obedience by requiring outward uniformity outweighed Goldman's individual rights.
[Tihe traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms
encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities
in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of
hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate individual distinctions
except for those of rank.'
A holding that provides that the military may freely require soldiers to subordinate their "personal preferences and
identities" might at first seem to present a difficult obstacle to
a gay servicemember who seeks to challenge the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy on the grounds that it forces him to affirm a
false identity. However, recalling exactly what the Air Force
was and was not empowered to do in Goldman places that
apparent obstacle in perspective. The Air Force had not deprived Goldman of the right to identify himself as Jewish; it
had deprived him of one particular mode of publicly expressing
his Jewish identity. Even after the Air Force forced him to
comply with its uniform dress code, Goldman remained free to
tell anyone and everyone that he was a rabbi and an orthodox
Jew. As important as the yarmulke was to Goldman as a form
of religious observance, it was not the only means by which he
could make his identity known.
To articulate the distinction in starker terms: The Air
Force did not compel Goldman to pretend that he was Catholic.
A regulation requiring Goldman to adopt a facade of Christianity would have been a literal "compelled orthodoxy"'--a

worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment ..

").

' See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 508.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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direct regulation of his identity-and would present a true
parallel to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. It was not
Goldman's identity, but the method he chose to express that
identity, that Goldman v. Weinberger empowered the Air Force
to regulate. Thus, under Goldman, a gay man in the military
could probably be prohibited from wearing a button bearing a
pink triangle and the slogan, "SILENCE=DEATH," even if he
were profoundly committed to the fight against AIDS and
considered the button to be a uniquely meaningful expressive
symbol. 5 But Goldman did not empower the military to require its Jewish soldiers to attend Christmas functions, go to
church on Sundays, and bow their heads while their peers said
grace at mealtime, all the while remaining completely silent as
to their true, Jewish identity. By the same token, it does not
lend support to a policy that directly regulates the identities of
gay servicemembers, forcing them constantly to affirm a false,
heterosexual identity.'
Indeed, Professor Cover would recognize the dress regulation that Goldman upheld as a natural incident of a strong
imperial institution like the military. As Cover explains, his
use of the term "imperial" is deliberately evocative of "the price
that is paid in the often coercive constraints imposed on the
autonomous realization of normative meanings."'37 Cover argues, in other words, that the commitment of an individual to
her religious, cultural or personal identity is sometimes constrained or muted in a strong imperial institution in order to
secure the stabilizing benefits that such an institution has to
offer.'
Cover distinguishes between such "criticalily]
1" See generally Yoshino, supra note 29, at 1781-93 (discussing importance of
pink triangle as symbol in gay community); HEINZ HEGER, THE MEN WITH THE
PINK TRIANGLE (David Fernbach trans., 1994) (documenting persecution of gay men
during Holocaust and use of pink triangle to identify gay prisoners in Nazi concentration camps).
...In her recent Article, Professor Halley has traced the conceptual and doctrinal steps that led to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. See Halley, supra note 9. In
what I take to be a similar observation to my own, Halley characterizes the "Don't
Tell" component of the policy as "a pervasive and intimate system of identity regulation." Halley, supra note 9, at 179.
13 Cover, supra note 58, at 13 n.36.
138

As Professor Cover puts it:

Maintaining the world is no small matter and requires no less energy
than creating it. Let loose, unfettered, the worlds created would be unstable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative and incoher-
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objectiv[e] "" 9 constraints on the expression of all individual
identities, on the one hand, and the direct regulation or exclusion of just certain identities, on the other. He characterizes
the direct regulation of certain identities as a proper activity
only for nongovernmental, sectarian communities."'
The Supreme Court's identity jurisprudence has taken
shape around a similar distinction. In contrast to Goldman,
the Court did review-and strike down-a direct regulation of
identity by the government in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston."" Recall that in
Hurley, the Court quashed an injunction requiring the Allied
War Veterans Council to admit the GLIB parade unit, finding
that the effect of the injunction would be to force the Council
to propound a message with which it disagreed. In its analysis
of the Council's claim, the Hurley Court reproduces the asseverations that the Council forwarded in litigation, accepts them
as a legitimate account of the Council's intended message, and
bases its analysis upon that message."' The message consists
primarily in the Council's definition of its own Irish identity.
As the Court says, "a contingent marching behind the
organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact
that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual .... The parade's
organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to
be so... ."' What the Council wished to assert, in other

ent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions. The sober
imperial mode of world maintenance holds the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, imposes the discipline of institutional justice upon norms,
and places the constraint of peace on the void at which strong bonds
cease.
Cover, supra note 58, at 16.
Cover, supra note 58, at 16.
140 See Cover, supra note 58, at 33 ("Even an accommodationist sectarian posio
tion-one that goes to great lengths to avoid confrontation or the imposition upon
adherents of demands that will in practice conflict with those imposed by the
state-establishes its own meaning for the norms to which it and its members
conform).
141 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
1
The Court goes on, however, to disavow any requirement that a litigant
pressing such a claim define its intended message with a high degree of particularity. See id. at 2345, 2348 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection. ...
(Wihatever the reason, it boils down to
the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view ....
).
14 Id. at 2348. I choose to concentrate here on the component of the Council's
message that involves the composition of the Irish-American community rather
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words, was that its Irish identity was a heterosexual one, unrelated to, and mutually incompatible with, homosexuality.
Upholding the right of the Council to exercise control over
its message concerning its Irish identity necessarily entailed
upholding the right of the Council to control the composition of
the parade. Since "GLIB's participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary deternuination about a unit admitted to the parade,"' the prospect of a visible gay presence in the parade threatened to alter
the Council's message by "bear[ing] witness to the fact that
some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual.""' In order to march
in the parade without presenting such a threat, gay and lesbian Irish-Americans would have had to march "dispersed
throughout John Hurley's crowd," as Professor Eskridge has
put it, so that "their sexual orientation would [be] invisible to
the audience.""" In awarding the Council a victory, the Court
recognized that the group had a vital interest in controlling the
public's perception of its identity as an Irishness that is naturally and necessarily heterosexual. "7 The "belief' that Massathan the portion of its message that deals with the "social acceptance" of gay men
and lesbians within that community, see id., because the former component focuses
more closely on individual identity rather than on matters of political and social
disputation. That said, there are important arguments to be made for the proposition that speech concerning gay identity is necessarily political in nature, at least
in contemporary America. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 1440-43, 1509-13. As
Professor Yoshino has explained, because sexual orientation is an invisible identifying characteristic-one, moreover, that is collectively repressed in ordinary public
discourse-gay identity is always already contested when it is brought out into the
open. See Kenji Yoshino, The Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection, 108 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 1998).
1" Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348. As Professor Eskridge has pointed out, the "customary" mode of determination that the Council employed in selecting units for
the parade was one of almost automatic acceptance. Unlike in the New York Saint
Patrick's Day parade sponsored by the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which also
has been the subject of a battle over gay participation, the Boston group exercised
very little discretion in the admission of units, rejecting only four applications
(including GLIB's) in the parade's history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out': Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and
Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458-59 (1997).
14 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348; cf. Elzie v. Aspin, 897 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1995) ("T]he Supreme Court made clear in [Hurley] that the statements of selfidentification of sexual orientation may contain a quite specific message .... The
Hurley Court recognized that the statement 'I am homosexual' expresses a viewpoint.").
." Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2461.
147 Professor Eskridge has characterized the Council's message as one of "coin-
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chusetts could not "compel" the Council to "affirm[ ]4s was a

belief in the particular nature of the ethnic and sexual identity
that the Council claimed for itself and its members.
This result also entails a recognition of the operation of
the heterosexual presumption. The marchers in the Boston
Saint Patrick's Day parade carried no banners proclaiming the
heterosexuality of the parade's organizers, its units, or its
participants. Such banners were not necessary for the Council
to communicate its message of heterosexual Irishness-and to
do so in a fashion that the Court was able to recognize without
difficulty-because a heterosexual identity is presumed to be a
part of ordinary social interactions unless an individual chooses to disavow that identity explicitly. For the same reason,
Justice Souter's reassurance that "open" gay and lesbian
marchers were welcome in the parade depends for its logical
coherence upon the operation of the heterosexual presumption. 49 It is only because the parade's audience would presume an otherwise-unidentified marcher to be heterosexual
that individual gay and lesbian marchers could participate in
the parade without altering the Council's message of heterosexual Irishness.5 0

pulsory heterosexuality," see Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459, aptly drawing
upon the insights of Adrienne Rich that are discussed in the previous Part. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
14-Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.
149 See id.
"1 Indeed, it appears that the Court is seeking to mitigate the less attractive
implications of the analytical framework it has articulated with its suggestion that
it was the "admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner"
that truly drove the controversy in Hurley and not the mere "participation of
openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various [other] units admitted to the
parade." Id. at 2347. While seemingly attractive as a means of downplaying the
intolerance of the Council's position, however, the space that this distinction carves
out is a very small one, indeed. What could the Court mean, after all, when it
suggests that the participation of 'openly gay, lesbian or bisexual people was not
contested in Hurley? Does it mean for "open" to refer only to the perceptions of
other marchers, suggesting that gay men and lesbians remained "free," for example, to discuss their same-sex spouses with other parade participants, but only so
long as they were not otherwise identifiable as gay and marched anonymously in
the parade? Within the context of the Court's analysis, this constrained reading is
necessary in order to make any sense of the assertion that "open" gay men and
lesbians were free to march. The Court could not have meant "open" to refer to
the perceptions of the parade's audience, for it would run directly contrary to the
logic of the opinion to allow the State to require the participation of this latter
kind of "openly gay" individual while forbidding the State to mandate the inclusion

1192

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1141

Similarly, although the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy contemplates that gay people will serve among the ranks of the
armed forces, it relies upon the ideological imperative of the
heterosexual presumption to place its brand upon them. By
forbidding expressions of gay identity in any form, at any time,
and with any individual-including a servicemember's family
and friends-the policy compels servicemembers constantly
and affirmatively to express a sexual identity of the military's
choosing.' 5 ' Indeed, some of the servicemembers interviewed
for this Article suggested that the heterosexual presumption
has dominated social interactions in the military even more
actively since the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy was put into
place.'5 2 Since sexual orientation was made a matter of active
concern in the military while the new policy was being debated, they have suggested, servicemembers are now more anxious to proclaim their heterosexuality loudly-and to put pressure on those around them to do the same-than they were

of GLIB.
If any individual marcher in the parade were identifiably gay-if he held
hands with his same-sex partner, for example, or if he were a famous public figure who was widely known to be gay because he had come out of the closet on
national television-then the presence of that individual would as much "bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian or bisexual," id. at 2348, as
would a GLIB parade unit. Professor Eskridge makes a similar observation in
pointing to the disturbing possibility that the Court's reasoning in Hurley could
have been employed to exclude women or black people from the Boston parade
altogether, since gender and racial identities are more clearly visible than is sexual orientation. See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2460. The Court's opinion in
Hurley rests on the understanding that whenever an identity is perceived to be
present-whether that identity is implicit, like the presumed heterosexuality of the
marchers in the Boston parade, or explicit, like a hypothetical Irish counterpart to
Ellen DeGeneres or Congressman Barney Frank-the identity constitutes meaningful and intelligible speech.
151 See supra note 48. As Professor Halley has said, "[tihe new policy apparently provides for the discharge of servicemembers who disclose anything about their
relationship to homosexuality-even a desire for information about it-to any.
one-even a single individual in the apparent privacy of a therapeutic relationship." Halley, supra note 9, at 181. Indeed, the military has vigorously pursued
this avenue of investigation and subpoenaed harmful testimony from the mothers
and fathers of servicemembers, both under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and
under the blanket ban that preceded it. See SLDN REPORT, supra note 47, at 9
(detailing use by Navy investigators of conversations between seamen and family
members as evidence in separation proceeding); SHILTS, supra note 70, at 99-204
(chronicling "witch hunts" for gay and lesbian servicemembers pursued under blanket exclusion).
..
2 See, e.g., Benecke Interview, supra note 38.
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under the blanket exclusion." Whether or not this observation holds true as a general proposition, it remains the case
that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy capitalizes upon the heterosexual presumption to enforce a direct regulation of the
sexual identities of gay and lesbian servicemembers.
COMPELLED SILENCE AS COMPELLED AFFIRMATION

IV.

The case of West Virginia v. Barnette, in which the Court
struck down the practice of compulsory school flag salutes, is
the necessary starting point for analyzing any compelled affirmation. Before beginning that analysis, however, a word about
the impact of the military context on a servicemember's First
Amendment rights is called for. The Court has frequently noted-though not without dissent-that servicemembers enjoy
reduced First Amendment protections in the military."
There are some restrictions on speech that may be permissible
in the armed forces even though they would be intolerable in
civilian life.' This is no less true of Barnette-style claims

See Beneke Interview, supra note 38. As Professor Halley has observed:
In units where the 1993 revisions are vigorously or even intermittently enforced, ... servicemembers who want the protection of heterosexual identity
will have to strive very hard to signify their entitlement to it-and they are
liable to be harmed rather than helped by the volatility of the semiotic system that the new rules provide (supposedly) for their benefit.
Halley, supra note 9, at 219.
As the Court has written:
[Wihile members of the military services are entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of
the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The
rights of military men must yield somewhat to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty ....
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (citations omitted) (quotation marks
omitted). But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 516 n.2 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that Government restraints on First Amendment rights, including limitations placed on military personnel, may be justified
only upon showing a compelling state interest which is precisely furthered by a
narrowly tailored regulation.").
" See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity
for obedience [in the military], and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.). But see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304
(1983) (" '[Olur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.' ") (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)).
13
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than it is of limitations on political advocacy'56 or public demonstrationl57-a fact of which the Barnette Court itself explicitly made note. 5 ' There are some practices in the military
that could properly be described as "compelled affirmations"
that are entirely appropriate and could not be called into question by any useful treatment of the First Amendment. The
requirement that soldiers salute their superior officers provides
perhaps the most visible example. While the special considerations that apply in the military context are as present in this
as in any other First Amendment analysis, I choose not to
explore the possible impact of those considerations at length
here. The primary purpose of this Article is to analyze the
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell policy burdens, not to argue that existing case law
absolutely compels a finding that the policy is unconstitutional.
Indeed, given the state of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in the military context, no such argument is possible.
The Court has never articulated any sort of test for the First
Amendment claims of military personnel, relying instead on a
form of analysis that is distinctly impressionistic.'59 What is
more, the one limitation that the Court has consistently imposed on the military's ability to restrict servicemembers' First
Amendment rights is to require that any such restriction be
applied in a neutral and evenhanded fashion. 6 The Don't
Ask, Don't Tell policy, which targets only the identities of gay
156 See

Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding regulation prohibiting
members of Air Force from distributing written material on base without prior
consent of superior officer); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (affi-ming conviction of Army captain who encouraged subordinates to refuse to fight in Vietnam
because of racial discrimination in troop assignments).
7 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding Army regulations allowing commanders to prohibit partisan political demonstrations on Army property
otherwise open to civilian traffic).
" See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 n.19
(1943) ("The Nation may raise armies and compel citizens to give military service .... It follows, of course, that those subject to military discipline are under

many duties and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to
those in civilian life.").
"' See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court rejects
Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted
right to the free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air Force in
uniformity of dress within the military hospital. No test for free exercise claims in
the military context is even articulated, much less applied.").
"6See supra note 69, and cases cited therein.
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and lesbian servicemembers, clearly fails to satisfy this basic
limitation. Thus, I limit the focus of this Article to the nature
of the burden that the policy inflicts under West Virginia v.
Barnette and leave the ultimate question of the policy's constitutionality to the federal judiciary.
Barnette involved a challenge to a West Virginia law...
that required all students, in both public and private schools,
to participate in courses on civics and government that included a mandatory salute and pledge of allegiance to the American flag."e The Court had recently upheld the practice of requiring such a pledge in the case of Minersville School District
v. Gobitis,'" assuming its propriety as a general matter and
declining to afford an exemption on religious grounds to the
litigants before it. The appellees in Barnette, like the claimants
in Gobitis, were adherents to the Jehovah's Witness religion.
They sought to convince the Court that they merited the religious exemption that the Court had previously declined to
extend. The Court, however, handed the appellees an even
broader victory, overruling its decision in Gobitis and striking
down the compulsory flag salute statute, in its entirety, on
Speech Clause grounds."6
The Court's language throughout Barnette is expansive
and its reliance on precedent sparse,16 reflecting both the
See W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941).
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.1. The pledge, which should be familiar to
anyone educated in an American public school, reads as follows: 'I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which
it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Id. at 628.629.
The words 'under God," were added to the pledge at a later time.
161
16

162

310 U.S. 586 (1940).

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The recent currency of Gebitis made the
Barnette Courtfs decision to overrule that case noteworthy in its own right. Indeed,
the Court heard the case on appeal from a district court panel that had ruled for
the petitioners on the more narrow grounds that the Free Exercise Clause required West Virginia to accommodate their religious beliefs. See id. at 630. Commentators frequently invoke Barnette in discussing the principle of stare decisis
and the propriety of overruling recent, controlling precedent. See, e.g., Charles
Alan Wright, My Favorite Opinion-The Second Flag-Salute Case, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1297, 1297 (1996).
16 Aside from the Gobitis case itself, Justice Jackson cites only two cases involving free speech and freedom of conscience in his entire majority opinion: Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), which upheld the right of the State to prescribe military training for students at public universities, and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), in which the Court held that the display of a red flag
as a symbol of opposition constituted speech meriting First Amendment protection.
1

1196

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW[6

[Vol. 63:1141

importance and the novelty of the First Amendment interest
that the Court recognized in the case.' 66 In framing the nature of that claim, the Court extended the reach of its "free
speech" protection beyond the realm of simple speech or symbolic conduct and embraced freedom of conscience as a value
lying at the core of the First Amendment.
[Tihe compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a
belief and an attitude of mind.... To sustain the compulsory flag
salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the
individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public au'
thorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. 67

At best, the Court found, such a compulsory exercise would
force the appellees to "simulate assent by words without belief
and by a gesture barren of meaning" 6 ' through an affirmation that they could disclaim after the exercise was over. At
worst, it would force them to "forego any contrary convictions
of their own and become unwilling converts to the prescribed
ceremony."'69 Either way, the result was the same: The statute imposed a burden on individual rights that was greater
even than that imposed by "censorship or suppression of expression of opinion"' 7 -- a burden that could be warranted only "on even more immediate and urgent grounds" 7 ' than the
See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632-33.
1'
Barnette was decided during World War II, and anxiety over totalitarianism
clearly served to inspire some of the Court's stirring rhetoric. Indeed, the Court
devotes some text and a paragraph-long footnote to the question of how closely the
physical component of the flag salute resembles the obeisances that Adolf Hitler
required of the German people under Nazism, see Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28 &
n.3, and it draws an explicit contrast between its holding in Barnette and the
strategies of "our present totalitarian enemies." See id. at 641. Similarly, Justice
Frankfurter, writing in lone dissent, makes claims for moral authority by beginning with a reminder that, as a Jew, he "belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history." See id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Even the
Civil War was apparently weighing upon the Justices' minds in Barnette, as evidenced by their acknowledgment of the types of disagreement that the choice of
terms in the pledge might be expected to provoke. See id. at 634 n.14 ("Use of
'Republic,' if rendered to distinguish our government from a 'democracy,' or the
words 'one Nation,' if intended to distinguish it from a Tederation,' open up old
and bitter controversies in our political history ... .
17 Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 633.
169Id.
170 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
171 Id. At the time the Court decided Barnette, the clear and present danger
test still predominated in First Amendment analysis. See, e.g., id. ("[Clensorship or
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grounds that other speech restrictions would require. Rejecting
the claim that the need for "national unity" as "the basis of
national security"" could provide the requisite urgency, Justice Jackson articulated a broad condemnation of those who
would seek to compel orthodoxy and radical uniformity in the
service of a coerced unanimity:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'

The core principles of Barnette have found wide application. Following its determination that the regulation of corporate speech is subject to the same kind of scrutiny as the regulation of an individual's speech, 74 for example, the Court has
prohibited government from forcing corporations to propound
messages with which they disagree. In Pacific Gas & Electric
v. Public Utilities Commission,75 a California utility company
successfully argued that the State could not force it to include
environmentalist literature with the newsletter that it sent
with its customers' monthly bills. "Were the government freely
able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messuppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the
expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is
empowered to prevent and punish."); see also Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.. 47, 52
(1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.") (Holmes, J.). The Barnette Courtes holding that compelled affirmations may
be justified only on a showing of "even more immediate and urgent grounds,"
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633, indicates, within the language that framed First
Amendment analysis at the time, the uniquely high degree of scrutiny that such
affirmations must receive.
172 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640 (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 595).
1
Id. at 642.
," See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("[Political speech] is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than
an individual."). In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that
placed restrictions on the efforts of corporations to influence the outcome of popular referenda. See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475
U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in
determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like
individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.") (citation omitted).
'75 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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sages with which they disagree," the Court found, the
protections of the First Amendment "would be empty, for the
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that
which they deny in the next."1 76 Barnette has also worked in

tandem with the Court's determination that the use of money
for political advocacy constitutes expressive activity that merits
First Amendment protection. 7 7 The case of Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education 78 established the proposition that workers cannot be forced, as a condition of their employment, to
contribute money to a union when that money will be used for
political advocacy that is unrelated to the union's role as a
bargaining representative. 179 The "freedom of belief' that
Barnette protects is, the Court said in Abood, is "no less applicable"'80 to such compulsory expenditures.
The most significant reaffirmation of Barnette as it applies
to the individual's interest in personal expression is Wooley v.
Maynard.8 ' Wooley concerned the placement of a state motto
on an automobile license plate. The plaintiffs, George and
Maxine Maynard, were residents of the State of New Hampshire. Since 1969, that state has required vehicles to carry
license plates displaying the state's official motto, "Live Free or
Die."'82 The Maynards, who were adherents to the Jehovah's
Witness religion,' objected to being forced to display the
motto on their car and brought suit to enjoin the state from
prosecuting them for their repeated attempts to cover the motto with tape. The Supreme Court granted the Maynards their
injunction, grounding its holding firmly in the principles it first
'76 Id.

at 16.
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) (per curiam) ("Making a
contribution . .. enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance
of common political goals . . . [and so] implicates fundamental First Amendment
interests."); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (reaffirming principle that "contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading
a political message is protected by the First Amendment").
178 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
178

See id. at 234-35.

o Id. at 235.
...430 U.S. 705 (1977).
"2 See id. at 706.
" Thankfully, the Court has never made any suggestion that the Barnette line
of cases applies only to confirmed Jehovah's Witnesses. Cf. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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articulated in Barnette. In particular, the Court reiterated that
the First Amendment protects "freedom of thought"' as well
as the freedom to engage in various forms of speech and conduct. "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking," it said, "are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "'" While the Court
recognized that "the affirmative act of a flag salute [that was
compelled in Barnette] involved a more serious infringement
upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the
state motto on a license plate," the latter requirement nonetheless "force[d] an individual... to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable2" The State may not, the Court held, so "invade]
the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."186
The extent to which a forced message touches upon matters of conscience or intimate personal concern is the question
with which Barnette and its progeny are, ultimately, the most
concerned. That consideration almost certainly drives the individual speaker's indignation in most Barnette claims. But such
an interest is also, by its very nature, defined in wholly subjective terms. In Hurley, for example, the parade organizers' simple assertion that the compelled affirmation occasioned by
GLIB's participation violated their deeply held personal beliefs
concerning Irish sexuality was sufficient to support a Barnette
claim, despite the absence of any measurable external indicia
of their demonstrated commitment to those beliefs." Thus,
although the dissonance between the speaker's beliefs and the
content of a compelled affirmation is the engine that drives the
Barnette doctrine, it does not provide a useful way of assessing
the relative seriousness of the burdens that different compelled
affirmations place upon involuntary speakers. For that, it is
necessary to develop more objective criteria with which to
compare such claims.

18 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (1977).
18 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (Murphy, J., concurring)). See supra,

text accompanying notes 94-95.

" Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (Ourphy,J., concurring)).
18

See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 2459-60.
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Together, Barnette and Wooley suggest at least two axes
along which the seriousness of the burden imposed by a compelled affirmation may be measured: the degree of linkage (or
attenuation) that exists between the message and the speaker;
and the opportunity available to the speaker to make clear to
others her disagreement with the message she is forced to
propound. The first of these may be called the "intimacy axis"-the measure of how personally or intimately the speaker
is implicated by a compelled affirmation. The second we can
call the "dissension axis"--the measure of the opportunity that
the involuntary speaker retains to make known her disagreement with the message." The compelled affirmations in
Barnette and Wooley are essentially complementary in the
manner in which they play out along these two axes.
In Barnette, there was no attenuation at all between the
mandatory pledge of allegiance and the individual student;
rather, the message was both immediate and personal. The
pledge itself was couched in solemn and earnest terms, and the
student was required both to speak the pledge out loud and to
accompany it with a salute indicating her sincerity in the
words that she spoke. On the other hand, there was ample
opportunity for the students in Barnette to make known to
others their disagreement with the pledge. Since the pledge
was conducted before classmates and teachers with whom the
students interacted on a daily basis, they could quite effectively qualify their participation in the pledge with explanations to
their peers that they were participating involuntarily and that
the pledge ran counter to their own beliefs.'89 Thus, it appar-

" This attempt to develop objectively quantifiable axes along which to measure
the seriousness of a compelled affirmation bears some similarity to Professor
Rubenfeld's attempt, in his privacy analysis, to use objective criteria to describe
the extent to which a regulation "takes over" an individual's life. See Rubenfeld,
supra note 81, at 784. Rubenfeld does briefly discuss Barnette in his Article, but
he takes great pains to distinguish laws concerning speech and expression from
the privacy rights that he seeks to address. See Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 78487. Rubenfeld's anxiety over the proximity of Barnette and its progeny to his own
theory probably signals his desire to limit the scope of his theory and to insulate
it from the charge that it will lead to an explosion of "newly discovered" constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 785 ("Because of the signal
role that speech plays in political freedom and because of the express constitutional guarantee, government in this country can hardly forbid or compel citizens to
utter a single opinion without violating their rights.").
'" Recall that the Barnette Court did not consider it important to determine
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ently was the weight of the burden imposed under the intimacy axis that drove the Court's decision in Barnette.
In Wooley, the degree of linkage, or intimacy, between
speaker and message was less than that in Barnette, but the
speakers were less able to qualify their apparent endorsement
of the contested message. In addressing the former consideration, the Court noted the contrast between the "affirmative
act of a flag salute" and the "passive act of carrying the state
motto on a license plate" when it acknowledged that, between
the two requirements, the motto constituted the less "serious
infringement."9 To render the distinction between the two
more precisely- The Maynards were not required to speak the
motto themselves but only to carry it on their property; the
motto was couched in considerably less personal terms than
was the pledge, employing a collective "we" rather than a solemn TI"; and the motto's ubiquity and its rather inauspicious
placement on a license plate diminished the extent to which it
would ever be perceived as the personal averment of any individual speaker, the Maynards included. On the other hand, the
Maynards did not have the opportunity personally to disclaim
their endorsement of the State's motto to all the motorists and
pedestrians who would regularly see them displaying it-their
ability to expressly dissent was curtailed."9 They could certainly have placed a bumper sticker on their car with some
sort of express disclaimer, but common sense suggests that
such an item would be neither very practical nor very effective

whether the statute before it required the students actually to believe the words
that they spoke or merely to recite them along with their classmates. See
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 ("It is not clear whether the regulation contemplates
that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling
converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning."). Cf.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (government cannot "require speakers to
affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next").
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
...Compare i. ('New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use
their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological mesAs a condition to driving an automobile.., the Maynards must dissage ....
play 'Live Free or Die' to hundreds of people each day.") with id. at 717 n.15 ("It
has been suggested that today's holding will be read as sanctioning the obliteration of the national motto, 'In God We Truse, from United States coins and currency... [However,] [clurrency is generally carried in a purse or pocket and
need not be displayed to the public.").
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and would make for a somewhat ridiculous spectacle in any
event. Thus, although the burden that the New Hampshire
statute imposed was lesser in "degree"192 than that associated
with the compulsory flag salute in Barnette, the weight of that
burden under the dissension axis was sufficient to allow the
Maynards to prevail.
When measured along these two axes, the affirmations of
heterosexual identity that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy
compels from gay servicemembers exhibit the worst characteristics of each of the affirmations in Barnette and Wooley.
Concerning the intimacy axis, the link between speaker and
message under the policy could not be more close. The facade
of heterosexuality that the policy requires gay servicemembers
to maintain serves to define the public identities by which they
are known, implicating every aspect of their social interactions.
Concerning the dissension axis, there is no opportunity for gay
servicemembers ever to make known their "disagreement" with
the heterosexual identity that the policy forces. them to propound. 93 Moreover, the only neutral disclaimer that one can
imagine a gay servicemember making-that is, a disclaimer
that would not violate the terms of the policy-would be the
repeated assertion, whenever a conversation carried intimations of a presumption of heterosexuality, that the
servicemember "does not mean by her participation in this
conversation to imply anything about her sexual orientation,"
or words to that effect. Even to frame the suggestion in words
demonstrates how impractical any such disclaimer would be.
More to the point, such a stultified and unnatural conversational handicap would reveal a servicemember's homosexuality
almost as quickly as would a bald assertion of her sexual orientation."" In Hurley, the Court noted the unworkability of
1"2 Id. at
19 Recall

715.
that even those statements that a servicemember makes to her family
and non-military friends can serve, without more, as the basis for a separation
proceeding under the policy. See supra notes 48, 151 and accompanying text. The
policy forces servicemembers to proclaim a false heterosexual identity, without
qualification, at all times and to all people.
"' See Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 850, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("It is unlikely in
the extreme that any enlisted member fit to serve would believe that closeted
homosexuals are not serving or would long retain that belief after asking another
enlisted member his or her sexual orientation and receiving the reply 'no comment.' ").
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any express disclaimer on the part of the parade organizers in
its analysis of their Barnette claim, concluding, "Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite
curious in a moving parade." 5 In this respect, "practice follows practicability" under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as
well.
The Court singled out compelled affirmations for categorically different treatment in West Virginia v. Barnette, finding
that they imposed an even greater burden on an individual's
First Amendment rights than do censorship and other straightforward restrictions on speech and advocacy 196-the
paradigmatic infringements on freedom of expression against
which we have traditionally understood the First Amendment
to offer protection. Even within that unique category of
disfavored state regulation, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is
extreme. The damage that the policy's compelled affirmations
of heterosexual identity inflict on the personal autonomy of gay
and lesbian servicemembers is more pervasive, more unrelenting and less subject to mitigation than any compelled affirmation that the Supreme Court has thus far been called upon to
review.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by using an imaginary conversation to
illustrate its central thesis. Perhaps a second hypothetical will
serve as an appropriate conclusion in order to account for the
failure of the Federal Courts of Appeals to understand the
nature of the First Amendment interest that the Don't Ask,

' Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bo3ton, 115 S.
Ct. 2338, 2349 (1995). Compare, also, the Court's reaction in P.G & E. to the
environmental group's suggestion that the inclusion of a disclaimer on its material
would prevent any misattribution of its views to P.G. & E. and so would eliminate
the Barnette problem:
The presence of a disclaimer on TURNs messages does not suffice to eliminate the impermissible pressure on appellant to respond to TURN's speech.
The disclaimer serves only to avoid giving readers the mistaken impression
that TURNs words are really those of appellant. It does nothing to reduce
the risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong disagreement with the substance of TURNs message.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 n.l (citations omitted).
' See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
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Don't Tell policy burdens. The Second, Fourth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have relied upon what might most charitably be
described as a lawyer's argument in conducting their analysis.
They have reasoned that the policy merely uses a gay
servicemember's statement of her identity as evidence-that is,
evidence that she probably stands in violation of the policy's
prohibition on exhibiting a "propensity" to engage in homosexual acts. 9 ' Because there is a "strong[] correlation... between those who state that they are homosexuals and those
98
who are at least likely to engage in [homosexual] acts,"
these courts have explained, the policy's evidentiary use of
identity speech is an entirely rational one. That being so, they
have concluded, the policy presents no problem under the First
Amendment so long as the underlying conduct restriction is
valid.'99 It is time, finally, to dispel the apparent magic of
19

See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. On the formal

definition of the term "propensity," see DoD Directive No. 1332.14, end. 3, pr. 1,
at H.1.b(2) ("propensity" is "more than an abstract preference to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in
homosexual acts"); Able, 88 F.3d at 1297-98 (deferring to government's definition
of "propensity" as indicating "likelihood" of engaging in proscribed conduct).
198Able, 88 F.3d at 1296. See also Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930 ("Such remarks
provide evidence of activity that the military may validly proscribe."); Richenberg,
97 F.3d at 262 (adopting Fourth Circuit's reasoning).
9 See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1300 (stressing contingent nature of this First
Amendment argument and remanding to district court for ruling on constitutionality of underlying conduct restriction).
Judge Kenneth Hall issued a vigorous dissent in Thomasson v. Perry. His
opinion, which was joined by Judges Ervin, Michael and Motz, criticizes the policy
primarily on equal protection grounds. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 949-52 (Hall, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hall takes aim at the validity of any restriction that purports
to rest on a distinction between sexual orientation and a "propensity" to engage in
broadly defined affectionate behavior. Arguing that this strained distinction has
nothing to do with " 'conduct' in any ordinary sense of the word," id. at 950,
Judge Hall concludes that Lt. Thomasson was discharged "only because he has
said that he is homosexual." Id. In other words, Judge Hall argues, the policy singles out servicemembers based on status alone, an action that is highly suspect
under the Equal Protection Clause. Regarding the First Amendment implications of
the Navy's action, Judge Hall suggests that the only evidentiary value that
Thomasson's "admission" possessed was with respect to his sexual orientation, and
not with respect to any conduct that could legitimately have served as a basis for
his discharge from the Navy. See id. at 953-54. The government's only possible
response to this objection, the Judge argues, is to "define [the] speech as 'conduct.'" Id. at 954. At that point, the statute must be understood to "be targeted at
suppressing the speech itself," and doing so for the impermissible purpose of accommodating "the prejudices of heterosexual servicemen." Id. Judge Hall concludes
that, when the disingenuity of the distinction between homosexual "status" and a
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this speech-as-evidence argument.
Imagine for a moment that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell statute gave a somewhat more narrow definition of the statements
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that
an individual stands in violation of the "propensity" restriction.
Suppose the statute provided that gay and lesbian soldiers
remain free to identify themselves honestly, with no adverse
effects, and that only statements indicating that a soldier actually intends to commit a "homosexual act" would raise the
damning presumption. Thus, if an openly gay servicemember
revealed to a friend that he planned to have a romantic encounter, or if he spoke excitedly of his plans to visit a brothel
in a foreign port-if, in other words, the servicemember said
anything to suggest that he was actively seeking to engage in a
"homosexual act"-then the military could take this as sufficient evidence of the servicemember's "propensity" and initiate
separation proceedings accordingly. A servicemember's mere
acknowledgment that he was gay, however, would not trigger
the policy, and all servicemembers would remain equally free
to make their respective sexual orientations known whenever
the occasion to do so might arise.
If the statute provided for this somewhat more refined
strategy for enforcing the "propensity" restriction, then the
policy would no longer compel gay servicemembers to affirm a
false identity."' Nonetheless, if an openly gay servicemember
"propensity" to engage in ordinary affectionate behavior is revealed, the speech-asevidence argument simply becomes inapplicable.
The project of this Article is to analyze the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy as it
is written, to demonstrate the burden that the policy-by its own terms-places on
the speech interests of gay and lesbian servicemembera, and to point out the inadequacy of the analytical framework offered by the Second, Fourth, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits to recognize and describe that burden. Judge Hall's dissent in
Thomasson takes aim at the very consistency and coherence of the policy's foundations. The Judge calls into question, not the adequacy, but the propriety of the
majority's First Amendment analysis, arguing that the disingenuous and spurious
nature of the statuspropensity distinction renders the speech-as-evidence argument
unavailable to the government. Judge Hall certainly has not been alone in maing
this argument. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 9, at 183-218; Halley, supra note 9, at
220 ("We need to be able to describe the discriminations of the new military antigay policy in terms of the relationshipbetween status and conduct, not by occluding one or the other."). The fact that this Article has chosen an approach that
differs from Judge Hall's should in no way be read as a repudiation of his powerful attack on the legitimacy of the policy and the motives that underlie it.
"' I do not mean to suggest that the regime outlined in this hypothetical is a
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living under this hypothetical policy were to tell a friend that
she planned to have a romantic encounter, and the military
used her statements as the basis for initiating a separation
proceeding, the speech-as-evidence argument might well suffice
to overcome any objection she might raise that this use of her
statements impermissibly restricted her freedom of expression'--assuming, as always, that the double standard for
conduct and "propensity" that underlies the policy is itself valid.202 The availability of the speech-as-evidence argument has
nothing to do with the question of whether the policy compels
gay servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual
identity. By the same token, when the policy does compel gay
servicemembers to make such false affirmations, the speech-asevidence argument does not serve to justify or mitigate the
burdens associated with those compelled affirmations. The two
analytical approaches simply address different First
Amendment questions. Thus, it is not a contradiction to observe that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy compels gay
servicemembers to make false affirmations of their sexual
identities at the same time that it provides for what might
otherwise be a permissible evidentiary use of their statements.
It is, rather, another way of demonstrating that the very definition of the conduct/propensity restriction, and the statements
that constitute sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that
the restriction has been violated, constitute the mechanism by
which the policy compels gay servicemembers to make these
false affirmations. °3

desirable one. While it would constitute an improvement over the current policy, it
would still punish a gay servicemember for conduct (and statements) that would
be entirely permissible for a straight servicemember, and it would do so solely on
the basis of the gay servicemember's sexual orientation. Such a policy raises serious questions under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
201 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-91 (1993) (reaffirming principle
that "[t]he First Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent" and upholding
sentencing enhancement provision on grounds that it did not have effect of chilling
protected speech).
202 See Able, 88 F.3d at 1296 n.8, 1299.
203 This observation has implications that far exceed the scope of this Article.
For a deeper exploration of those implications, it is necessary to turn to the work
of Professor Halley, who has written extensively on the relationship between act
and identity-in particular, the relationship between sodomy and homosexual iden-
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For this reason, the mode of analysis that the various
Circuits have employed in their review of the policy is radically
incomplete. None of these reviewing courts has recognized the
expressive power of the silence that the policy compels gay
servicemembers to maintain; none has analyzed the manner in
which the policy compels gay servicemembers constantly to
affirm a heterosexual identity.2 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit
panel that issued Richenberg v. Perry disposed of Captain
Richard Richenberg's First Amendment claims in a section
that measured only two short paragraphs." That panel began its Speech Clause analysis with the following observation.
Under the prior policy, the military asked applicants if they were

tity-in exploring the powerful change that Bowers u. Hardwick worked upon the
legal landscape for gay, lesbian and bisexual people. See, e.g., Halley, supra note
5. Halley has repeatedly challenged the reflexive assumption that sodomy--or any
particular sexual act-is properly definitive of the class of "homosexuals" Rather,
she argues, '[t]he patterns that emerge from recent empirical and theoretical work
on the subject compel the conclusion that homosexual identity, far from being the
equivalent of sodomy, is constituted in precisely the political process which, under
the equal protection clause, the courts are pledged to protect.' Halley, supra note
5, at 923.
204 In contrast, Judge Eugene Nickerson of the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York has evinced a deeper understanding of how the
policy operates. Judge Nickerson wrote the opinion that the Second Circuit reversed in Able. See Able v. U.S., 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), reu'd and
remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d. Cir. 1996). While he rested his First Amendment
analysis on a rejection of the status/propensity distinction, see id., at 973-76--an
approach similar to that adopted by Judge Hall in Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
930-Judge Nickerson's discussion of the government's unit cohesion argument displayed a welcome sensitivity to the degree of deception that is inherent in the
policy. As the Judge wrote, "[c]ommon sense suggests that a policy of secrecy,
indeed what might be called a policy of deception or dishonesty, will call unit
cohesion into question." Able, 880 F. Supp. at 979. Judge Hall acknowledged the
wisdom of this observation in his Thomasson dissent. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
952 (Hall, J., dissenting).
On remand, Judge Nickerson again struck down the policy, this time on equal
protection grounds. In that opinion, the judge made a similar point without mincing words:
For the United States government to require those self-identifying as
homosexuals to hide their orientation and to pretend to be heterosexuals
is to ask them to accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself
disgraceful and they are unfit to serve. To impose such a degrading and
deplorable condition for remaining in the Armed Services cannot in fairness be justified on the ground that the truth might arouse the prejudice
of some of their fellow members.
Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp 850, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
205 See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1996).
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homosexual and excluded those who answered affirmatively. The
new policy is less restrictive-the military now ignores the issue
unless a service-member affirmatively evidences a propensity to engage in conduct inconsistent with military service."7

Any court that concludes, after purportedly conducting a
searching First Amendment inquiry, that the forcibly imposed
closet of the new policy is "less restrictive" of servicemembers'

speech interests than was the blanket exclusion that preceded
it, betrays a lack of understanding of the lived experience of

gay and lesbian servicemembers that is inexcusable." 7 If this
Article has one purpose, it is to help to eliminate this species
of privileged ignorance.0

8

Gay servicemembers did suffer many of the injuries and
indignities that this Article has described in equal measure

under the blanket exclusion that preceded the Don't Ask, Don't
Tell policy. Some gay people, when presented with an official

policy of exclusion, chose to hide their identities and enter the
military even though they knew that, in theory, they were not
supposed to be there. Others came to realize that they were
gay only after committing themselves to a life and a career in
military service.' °9 In many cases, the harms that the old pol-

at 263.
also Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136 (opining that, even when servicemembers
are discharged for nothing more than identifying themselves as gay, "the First
Amendment is not implicated."); Able, 88 F.3d at 1299-1300 (characterizing policy
as creating "a reasonable balance" between "a service member's privacy interest
and the military interest in prohibiting homosexual acts").
2"8 See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 1788-93 (discussing costs of "carefully culti206

Id.

2"7 See

vated" judicial ignorance of gay people and gay life); Sedgwick, supra note 18, at
23.

209 Allan B~rub6 discusses this dynamic in his pathbreaking investigation into
the experiences of gay servicemembers during World War II. B~rub6's description
of the "psychological screening" process that the armed forces used in its attempt
to exclude gay people (and others who were "mentally unbalanced") provides a
good example of the hapless position in which young servicemembers often found
themselves then, and continue to now. Psychological "screeners" in the post-World
War I era regularly asked inductees, with varying degrees of directness, whether
they were gay. See BtRUB9, supra note 74, at 8-32. B6rub6 explains that many
inductees simply had not yet confronted the issue:
Gay selectees who said 'no' sometimes believed that they were telling
the truth. Some did not yet think of themselves as gay. In early 1942,
right after Pearl Harbor was bombed, twenty-year-old Woodie Wilson
enlisted in the Air Force at an induction station outside Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, where, he recalled, "I was asked the big question, 'Are you
a homosexual?' And I certainly said 'no' and didn't believe I was." Others
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icy inflicted were the direct result of the military's abusively
selective enforcement of the blanket exclusion." ' Even when
the military did not deliberately abuse its authority, the impossibility of perfect enforcement-or even reasonably consistent
enforcement-of a policy that sought to exclude a class of peo-

could truthfully say no because they had not yet had any sexual experiences ....
Still others had never heard the clinical term homosexual
before and guessed that it didn't apply to them. "Going into the service
the word 'homosexual' was used," recalled Raymond Mailloux, who in
July 1943 was drafted into the Army in Fall River, Massachusetts, at the
age of eighteen. "And like everyone else, of course, I said 'no'. Because I
truly did not know what 'homosexual' meant. We didn't call it that. We
called it more or less being 'queer' or 'fruit.' And it wasn't even till later
that I knew it pertained to women also."
Id. at 23-24.
Coming to terms with one's sexuality and embracing an adult identity is a
complicated process, and many of us do not complete the task before being confronted with important life decisions, including the decision of whether to join the
military. This is no less true of the servicemembers who agreed to be interviewed
for this Article. Among those who have already been introduced in the sections
above, neither Elizabeth Hillman nor Anonymous Officer Number One knew that
she was gay at the time that each entered her respective branch of the armed
forces. See HiUman Interview, supra note 34; Anonymous Interview Number One,
supra note 35; text accompanying note 213, infra. Indeed, as Michelle Beneche
points out, coming to terms with questions about one's sexuality is made all the
more difficult when one enters an environment where even discussing the issue
can result in immediate discharge. See Benecke Interview, supra note 38.
21 The story of Sergeant Perry Watkins provides one of the mo3t
extraordinary
examples of this kind of selective enforcement. His saga is told in great detail in
Conduct Unbecoming. See SHIL'S, supra note 70, at 61-63, 79-80, 161-62, 218-19,
230, 241-43, 395-98. Watkins was inducted into the Army in 1968. From the first,
he openly told anyone who might wish to know that he was gay, including the
psychiatrist who conducted his induction interview. Even so, the Army did not initially attempt to bar Watkins from service; quite the contrary, it actively sought
out his "non-heterosexual" services. Watkins was an accomplished drag queen, and
the Army enthusiastically employed him during the Vietnam War to entertain the
troops. The Army also repeatedly attempted to drum Watkins out of the service
over the years because he was gay, periodically "discovering" this damning piece of
information whenever it was convenient. Watkins' tenure in the Army is an almost
comic series of smash-hit, Army-sponsored performances as the fabulous 'Simone"
interspersed with career-threatening discharge proceedings.
When the Army finally tried to kick Watkins out of the service once and for
all, Watkins brought suit in federal court to fight his discharge. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, found the Army's course of conduct so outrageous that they applied an estoppel and refused to allow the military to use the
fact that Watkins was gay as grounds for his discharge-an unprecedented use of
this kind of equitable remedy against the military. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
Sergeant Watkins died of complications resulting from the AIDS virus on
March 17, 1996. See N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1996, at 5.
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ple on the basis of an invisible characteristic left gay
servicemembers constantly exposed and vulnerable. It is for
these and many other reasons that a blanket exclusion of gay
people from a pluralistic State institution like the military
raises serious questions under the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, particularly following
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v. Ev211
ans.
Whatever else may be said about the blanket exclusion,
however, it never purported to embrace the infliction of such
harms upon gay servicemembers as the intended mode of the
policy's operation, never codified the infliction of such harms
into the letter of a regulation or statute. That is what the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has done. By inviting gay people to
serve in the armed forces but compelling them to lie about the
most personal aspects of their identities, the new policy places
the power of the State behind an offense to servicemembers'
First Amendment rights that the military could previously
argue that most gay servicemembers were imposing upon
themselves. That compulsion, and the harms that attend it,
are now written into the definitions that drive the statute.212
2" 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See also Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d
1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Construing the [blanket ban] to apply to the 'classification of being homosexual' clearly implicates equal protection."); Able v. United
States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (characterizing as "weak" the argument that "sexual tensions" engendered by mere presence of openly gay
servicemembers might justify blanket exclusion of gay people from military).
I have argued elsewhere that the decision in Romer constitutes a conscious
signal by the Court that it will henceforth be more solicitous of the civil rights
claims of gay litigants, a signal that is deliberately evocative of the shift that the
Court effected in its gender-discrimination jurisprudence in the case of Reed V.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247 (1996). Indeed, the insensitive treatment that the Federal
Courts of Appeals have afforded to the First Amendment claims of gay litigants
thus far, see supra, text accompanying notes 205-208, is indicative of the kind of
'empathy failure" that suggests that some form of heightened scrutiny for the
disfavored group might in fact be warranted. See Yoshino, supra note 29, at
1763-72, 1807; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103, 160-64 (1980).
212 Compare Professor Halley's description of an opinion by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court construing and upholding a statute that forbids gay people to
serve as foster parents. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (1987). In
that case, the New Hampshire Court interprets the prohibition of the statute to
provide an exception for people who have had same-sex sexual experiences but
who "did not intend them in such a way as to merit the label 'homosexual.' "
Halley, supra note 5, at 950; see In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 23-24.
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More even than the plain language of the statute, however, it is the stories of the gay servicemembers who have served

and who continue to serve under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy that most clearly demonstrate what it means to live
inside the walls of a forcibly imposed closet. Anonymous Officer Number One-a courageous and honorable woman whose
willingness to add her story to this Article touched the author
very deeply-ended her interview with the following sentiment.
I didn't know I was gay when I joined the service. When I found out
I was gay, I knew the service didn't appreciate it. I know they will
kick me out if I don't stay quiet. But it feels rotten to have to lie
every day. After all, rm gay 24 hours a day, whether or not I have
sex. It kills me to have to lie to my close friends in the service about
such an important part of my life. These are people who think
they're my very best friends. They don't even know me.2U

Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson warned us of the
harm that could result from an attempt to compel complete
orthodoxy in matters of opinion and identity. "Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent," he wrote, "soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard ....
[Tihe First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings."' 4 The Don't
Ask,Don't Tell policy invites gay men and lesbians to serve in
the armed forces only at the cost of living under a constant
compulsion to lie about who they are. It is to our great shame
that the federal judiciary has not yet understood this fact and
learned to employ an informed First Amendment analysis in
describing and reviewing the policy. Let us hope that the "fixed
star"21 of West Virginia v. Barnette can finally begin to light
the way.

As Halley observes:

[This] category includes individuals whose desires may be predominantly
homosexual, who have acted on them, but who have determined to mask
these facts from themselves by embracing a purely heterosexual subjective identity, and from others by passing as straight The court's example
forgives these lies and builds them into the scheme of state enforcement.
Halley, supra note 5, at 950.
"1 Anonymous Interview Number One, supra note 35.
214 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
215 Id.
at 642.
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